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THE PROBLEM OF GENE PATENTS 
NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO*
ABSTRACT 
Genes are scientific discoveries and therefore they fail to meet the 
condition of alternativeness, which is the fourth substantive condition for 
patentability.1 Hence, genes are not patentable subject matter even when 
they meet the three other conditions. The condition of alternativeness is an 
essential tool for the patent system to perform its metering function for, in 
its absence, the patentee’s competitors cannot use existing technology or 
develop alternatives.2 Competition with patented technology allows 
society to accurately meter inventions, and thus efficiently reduce 
transaction costs. Countries that grant gene patents undermine the patent 
system in the area of biotechnology; this will lead to serious problems of 
inefficiency and high transaction costs. This concern is eloquently 
illustrated by agrarian discontent in the United States in the late nineteenth 
century, which arose under the pressure of a malfunctioning patent system. 
 
 
 * J.D., LL.M, S.J.D., Federal University of Minas Gerais, Brazil; LL.M. (1992), S.J.D. (1993), 
Washington University in St. Louis, MO, USA. The author is Deputy Director and Head of the 
Industrial Property Law Section, Economic Development (Intellectual Property Law) Department, 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Geneva, Switzerland. All views expressed are the 
author’s and not necessarily those of WIPO or its Member States. 
 1. The other substantive conditions of patentability that the Supreme Court has identified are 
novelty, non-obviousness, and utility. LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852). See discussion infra Part 
II.
 2. See discussion infra Part III. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article submits that the main problem with gene patents3 is the 
failure to meet the condition of alternativeness of inventions—a condition 
that embodies a core function of the patent system. As a result, gene 
patents conflict with the very rationale of the patent system. On the one 
hand, gene patents generate exclusive rights in discoveries, which does not 
necessarily pose a legal barrier to patentability, depending on the meaning 
of the word “discoveries.”4 However, when “discoveries” refers to 
products of nature or scientific truths, the patent system can, from a legal 
point of view, encompass discoveries as patentable subject matter only if 
the three substantive conditions of patentability are met: novelty, non-
obviousness, and utility. The problem of gene patents, therefore, cannot be 
assessed from that perspective. At the same time, availability of patent 
protection for genes elicits criticism because of the restrictions that 
property rights place on downstream research and development of 
commercial products.5 One solution for this problem is to exclude gene-
related technology from patentability without any scrutiny as to whether or 
not it has an inventive nature. Another proposal would establish certain 
exceptions to rights conferred by gene patents or would submit gene patent 
 3. For the purposes of this Article, the term “gene patents” means patent claims covering human 
genes or portions of human genes; the proteins for which they code in the human body (their natural 
environment); human genes as isolated, purified or synthetic molecules; and any combination thereof. 
For the purposes of this Article, “genes” includes the DNA fragment encoding the particular gene, 
expressed sequence tags (“ESTs"), and the messenger RNA (mRNA). “A gene is an ordered sequence 
of nucleotides [within a fragment of DNA] located in a particular position on a particular chromosome 
that encodes a specific functional product (i.e. a protein or RNA molecule).” National Plant Genome 
Initiative, Glossary, at http://www.ostp.gov/html/genome/genome_6.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2004). 
DNA is a double-stranded molecule held together by weak hydrogen bonds between nucleotide base 
pairs. These nucleotide bases, namely Adenine (A), Thymine (T), Guanine (G), and Cytosine (C), are 
the building blocks of DNA. Because of their particular chemical composition, A’s base pair only with 
T’s and G’s base pair only with C’s.  
 The mRNA is a single-stranded copy of a gene that carries the genetic information to the 
ribosomes. The ribosomes are the sites of protein synthesis in the cell. Proteins are made up of a chain 
of amino acids by deciphering the genetic code. Each set of three consecutive nucleotide bases in the 
mRNA codes for a single amino acid. Proteins are the building blocks and enzymes required for cell 
survival. A molecule of DNA or RNA is described by the specific order of nucleotide bases which is 
determined by “sequencing.” The number of base pairs or bases is used to describe the size of a DNA 
or RNA molecule. See id. Although this Article discusses the patentability, or lack thereof, of human 
genes, the analysis can be extended mutatis mutandis to plant and animal genes. Even though the 
ethical and economic pressure is not as high in these two fields, the condition of alternativeness is 
likewise applicable to non-human genomic inventions. 
 4. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra Part I.C.  
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applications to a heightened scrutiny regarding conditions of patentability, 
in particular, utility.6
Part I looks briefly at the aforementioned criticisms and explains why 
they fail to address the real problem of gene patents. The laws of several 
countries exclude genes from patentability in very broad terms by 
identifying them as scientific discoveries.7 Such a legalistic approach does 
not provide an answer regarding the appropriateness, or lack thereof, of 
the policy of excluding genes from patentability. This solution thus does 
not help those countries to assess whether they should change or continue 
their legal policy.  
Applying the criteria of patentability to the field of DNA recombinant 
technology, which differs from those used in other areas of technology, is 
not only inconvenient, it also infringes the non-discrimination rule of 
article 27.1 of the TRIPs Agreement.8 Under this provision, once national 
law establishes that gene-related technology is patentable subject matter, 
no exceptions to the confirmed rights or the conditions of patentability can 
be imposed on that technology that are not also imposed in other fields of 
technology. 
This Article does not intend to scrutinize the products of nature 
doctrine from a legal or a technical standpoint. Instead, this Article 
discusses the rationale of the products of nature doctrine and does not 
include within its scope the relevance of the products of nature doctrine to 
individual patent applications. 
 6. See generally Ng-Loy Wee Loon, Patenting of Genes—A Closer Look at the Concepts of 
Utility and Industrial Applicability, 33 IIC-INT’L REV. OF IND. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 393 (2002); 
John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and 
Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101 (2001). Utility, for patent purposes, means the 
invention is susceptible to use in producing services and goods. It does not mean that the invention is 
particularly appreciated by society, but simply that it works.  
Utility does not mean a useful technical advance in respect of the prior art. Patents are not 
certificates of merit. It is for the market to decide whether the patented invention is useful or 
not. The utility requirement emphasizes the technical aspect of inventions. It means that 
inventions, in order to be patentable, must be capable of being used in the production of 
goods and services.  
NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS 146 (2002). 
 7. See infra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.  
 8. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO], Annex 1C, 
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter 
“the TRIPs Agreement” or “TRIPs”]. See infra note 18 for the text of article 27.1. Despite this article, 
it is possible to apply the same criteria of patentability with a certain level of adaptation to the specific 
nature of the technology, according to the practices of each country. See infra note 110 and 
accompanying text. 
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Part II analyzes the patentability of genes from a more conceptual and 
fundamental perspective. This part, based on a consistent line of United 
States Supreme Court opinions, explains that the core rationale of the 
product of nature doctrine lies in the condition of alternativeness of 
inventions. This condition requires that patents can only be granted for 
inventions that are susceptible to being alternated by competing 
technology (i.e., technology that exists in the public domain, proprietary 
technology that lies within the exclusive control of certain individuals, or 
technology yet to be developed).  
Part III revisits the primary rationale of the patent system: the metering 
function of inventions. Part III explains that the condition of 
alternativeness is an essential tool for the patent system because it permits 
patentees’ competitors to develop and use alternative technology (both 
technology that is in the public domain and propriety technology). In this 
vein, the condition of alternativeness has already been invoked to refuse 
the application of the essential facility doctrine in the field of patents.9 Due 
to the susceptibility of inventions to being alter-invented (referring to the 
creation of alternative technical solutions for the same problem using the 
same natural principles), they do not constitute essential facilities. 
Furthermore, Part III emphasizes the economic risks arising from an 
incorrect use of the patent system, which distorts its function and makes it 
work less efficiently. The agrarian discontent that arose in the last decades 
of the nineteenth century in the United States illustrates this assertion. 
This Article argues that the solution to problems posed by gene patents 
does not lie in diminishing patent rights, but rather in accepting that genes 
are non-statutory patentable subject matter. Genes, as products of nature, 
are not susceptible to “alter-invention.” Because genes are not prone to 
alter-invention, the patents granted on DNA sequences, their fragments, or 
the proteins that these sequences are coded for, do not permit market 
forces to compete interactively, which otherwise would allow society to 
evaluate or meter inventions in a relatively accurate fashion. Because this 
metering is the primary function of patents, gene patents, as well as all 
patents for natural products, run counter to the very rationale of the patent 
system. 
Part III carefully avoids discussion of the ethical and environmental 
issues that frequently arise in the context of gene patents. Similar to the 
scope of patentable subject matter, ethical and environmental concerns 
also depend on national perceptions, thus making it very difficult to take a 
 9. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/2
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position that encompasses the wide variety of views and, thus, issues of 
ethics and environmental safety are beyond the scope of this Article. The 
rationale of the patent system itself is at issue here, not the limits of patent 
protection. 
This Article concludes that gene patents are contrary to the economic 
rationale of the patent system and therefore should not be patentable 
subject matter as a matter of law. 
I. TAMPERING WITH THE PATENT SYSTEM TO ADDRESS PARTICULAR 
CONCERNS STEMMING FROM GENE PATENTS 
The idea persists that gene patents harm scientific and commercial 
research. As the building blocks of life, genes form the raw material for all 
processes and products that originate, or are originated from, genetic 
engineering. Genetic engineering is the technology that consists of 
transferring genes between organisms, including diagnostic tests for 
detecting diseases, therapeutic methods, and biological products. Thus, 
once a patent is issued on a certain gene, all commercial applications of 
that gene require an authorization from the patent holder. Furthermore, 
gene patents are particularly controversial because they are upstream of a 
largely unexplored field, both scientifically and commercially. A patent 
owner may block any future use of a certain gene, regardless of whether 
the proposed use seeks to clarify the gene’s particular role in the human 
cell or to develop the gene for commercial applications. The cases 
demonstrating this problem have been widely publicized. 
For example, the Miami Children’s Hospital, which owns a patent for a 
gene responsible for Canavan Disease (a neurological disorder), prevents 
doctors from testing or examining patients for the gene without paying a 
fixed royalty fee.10 In another example, several European laboratories have 
refused to recognize, and are actually challenging the validity of, a patent 
held by Myriad Genetics, a U.S. company, on a gene “that is strongly 
linked to breast and ovarian cancer.”11 These breast cancer genes, BRCA1 
and BRCA2, have become the subject of a resolution by the European 
Parliament, which recalled that the patent owner licensed U.S. genetic 
 10. 148 CONG. REC. E 355 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2002) (statement of Hon. Lynn N. Rivers, 
Member, House) (introducing the “Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002,” 
H.R. 3967, 107th Cong. (2002), and the “Genomic Science and Technology Innovation Act of 2002” 
H.R. 3966, 107th Cong. (2002)), available at http://www.house.gov/science_democrats/member/ 
lr031402.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2004). 
 11. Id. See Matthew Rimmer, Myriad Genetics: Patent Law and Genetic Testing, 25 EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 20 (2003). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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laboratories to test for a very limited number of mutations of BRCA1 and 
BRCA2, and that corresponding patent applications had been filed with 
the European Patent Office (EPO).12 The European Parliament expressed 
“its dismay at the possible consequences of the granting by the European 
Patent Office of a patent on a human gene” and, among other 
recommendations, stated that the European Council, the European 
Commission and the Member States should “adopt the measures required 
to ensure that the human genetic code is freely available for research 
throughout the world and that medical applications of certain human genes 
are not impeded by means of monopolies based on patents.”13 Similarly, 
the American College of Medical Genetics stated its concern over current 
patterns of gene patent enforcement.14
In order to avoid, or at least reduce, the negative impact on downstream 
research and product development, some have sought either to change the 
law or the process of granting patents in the field of gene technology. 
These proposals may be classified in three categories: (a) those that would 
exclude genes from patentability regardless of their potentially inventive 
nature; (b) those that accept their patentability but impose limitations or 
exceptions to rights conferred; and (c) those that accept patentability of 
genes without modifying the standards of protection, but adopt a different 
approach to the conditions of patentability, in particular, with regard to 
utility. 
A. Excluding Genes From Patentability 
The European Parliament, among others, purports to exclude human 
genes from patentability in order to facilitate genetic research.15 The new 
 12. Text of the European Parliament Resolution on the patenting of BRCA1 and BRCA2 (“breast 
cancer”) genes, available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/biotech/eu-brca.html (last visited Aug. 
12, 2003) [hereinafter European Parliament Resolution]. See also Steve Bunk, Researchers Feel 
Threatened by Disease Gene Patents, 13[20] THE SCIENTIST 7 (1999), available at http://www.the-
scientist.com/yr1999/oct/bunk_p7_991011.html (by free registration only) (last visited Aug. 4, 2003). 
 13. Id. 
 14. American College of Medical Genetics, Position Statement on Gene Patents and 
Accessibility of Gene Testing, (Aug. 2, 1999), http://genetics.faseb.org/genetics/acmg/pol-34.htm (last 
visited Aug. 13, 2003). Their concern is 
monopolistic licensing that limits a given genetic test to a single laboratory, royalty-based 
licensing agreements with exorbitant up-front fees and per-test fees, and licensing agreements 
that seek proportions of reimbursements from testing services. These limit the accessibility of 
competitively priced genetic testing services and hinder test-specific development of national 
programs for quality assurance. They also limit the number of knowledgeable individuals 
who can assist physicians, laboratory geneticists and counselors in the diagnosis, management 
and care of at-risk patients. 
 15. European Parliament Resolution, supra note 12. It is worth noting that four years earlier, the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/2
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position of the European Parliament conforms to the standards of 
patentability as adopted by a large number of countries, where genes are 
explicitly or implicitly identified as non-patentable subject matter. For 
example, article 2(5) of Egypt’s recently-enacted Law No. 82/02 states 
that “organs, tissues, live cells, natural biological substances, nuclear acid 
and genome” shall be barred from patentability.16 The Patents Amendment 
Act of India likewise excludes “plants and animals in whole or any part 
thereof other than microorganisms, but including seeds, varieties and 
species” from patentability.17
The language of these two provisions seems to indicate that their 
particular exclusions are based on the language of article 27.3(b) of the 
TRIPs Agreement,18 which permits the exclusion of some inventions in the 
same European Parliament reluctantly approved the European Directive on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions. Article 5.2 of the Directive states that, “an element isolated from the 
human body or otherwise produced by means of a technical process, including the sequence or partial 
sequence of a gene, may constitute a patentable invention, even if the structure of that element is 
identical to that of a natural element.” Council Directive 98/44, art. 5.2, On the Legal Protection of 
Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L213) 39.45, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1998/l_213/l_21319980730eu00130021.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2004). An 
intermediate solution was proposed by Philippe Jacobs and Geertrui Van Overwalle, Gene Patents: A 
Different Approach, 23 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 505 (2001). These commentators suggested  
Perhaps patents should no longer be granted for DNA, but only for new medicinal products, 
new vaccines and genetic tests that are developed on the basis of DNA. . . . In other words, 
only patents on the end products would be granted, while patents on the base product used to 
make these products would be refused. Expressed in technical terms, this means that there 
would be no more patents on DNA as a research tool (product claims), but there would be 
patents on the use of DNA to diagnose, prevent, or treat a specific disease (use claims) and on 
the resulting end product.  
Id. This suggestion is plainly wrong because it is based on the misleading and erroneous idea that one 
can distinguish between inventions that are research tools and inventions that are end products. 
Actually, a stretch of DNA can be simultaneously a tool for research and a component of a commercial 
product. A microscope is undoubtedly a research tool, but it is also a commercial article. The legal 
regime governing the microscope does not vary according to its specific utility: if a scientist performs 
some acts covered by the patent in order to understand the microscope’s architecture, the scientist will 
probably be covered by a research exemption (but in that event the microscope has no commercial 
utility). But if the scientist manufactures a microscope and uses it to investigate scientific activities 
that do not relate to the academic unveiling of any of microscopes’ features and mode of operation, 
such activity would constitute an infringement. In this event, the scientist would be using the 
microscope as a research tool of a commercial nature. The commercial nature (and the end-product 
nature) of research tools is taken for granted by manufacturers and commercial distributors. 
 16. Law No. 82/02, art. 2(5), O.J. NO. 2 bis (June 2, 2002) (Egypt), available at 
http://www.egypo.gov.eg/inner/english/PDFs/law2002e.pdf (last visted Apr. 18, 2004). 
 17. The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 38 § 4 (2002), (India), available at 
http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patentg.pdf (last visted Apr. 18, 2004). 
 18. Article 27 of the TRIPs agreement provides: 
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for any 
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are 
new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application [footnote omitted]. 
Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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field of biotechnology from patentability. They do not appear to be based 
on the language of article 27.1, which does not require WTO members to 
make patents available for discoveries or products of nature. 
The Egyptian and Indian statutory provisions contrast to some extent 
with the language adopted by the patent statutes of Brazil and the Andean 
Community. Brazil’s patent law establishes that “all or part of natural 
living beings and biological materials found in nature, even if isolated 
therefrom, including the genome or germoplasm of any natural living 
being, and the natural biological processes” are “not considered to be 
inventions or utility models.”19 Similarly, the decision of the Andean 
Community on the common regime of industrial property states that “any 
living thing, either complete or partial, as found in nature, natural 
biological processes, and biological material, as existing in nature, or able 
to be separated, including the genome or germ plasm of any living thing” 
shall not be considered inventions.20 The contrast lies in the qualification 
of the excluded matter as not being inventions. Thus, in the cases of Brazil 
and the Andean Community, article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement 
controls. 
There are two principal arguments for excluding genomic technology 
from patentability. The first is that patents should not cover genes because 
they offend morality. The second argument excludes patents for genees 
because the patents on genes are inconvenient. 
Article, patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the 
place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally 
produced. 
2. Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of 
the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect order public or morality, 
including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the 
environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is 
prohibited by their law. 
3. Members may also exclude from patentability: 
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals; 
(b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for 
the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes. 
However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by 
an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. The provisions of this 
subparagraph shall be reviewed four years after the date of entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement. 
TRIPs, supra note 8, art. 27. 
 19. Brazilian Industrial Property Act, LAW NO. 9.279, art. 10 IX (1996). 
 20. Decision 486, art. 15(b) (Sept. 14, 2000) (Andean Community). The Andean Community of 
Nations is formed by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. The decision has the force of 
national law in the community member states. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/2
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The European Parliament strongly advocated the former argument.21 In 
the same vein, the government of the Netherlands has requested the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) to annul the European 
Directive on several grounds, including offense to human dignity.22  
The argument raised by the Netherlands was defeated twice. First, the 
Advocate General Jacobs said that, under the Directive, only genes that are 
isolated from their natural state and purified can be patented and that 
because genes in their natural state (i.e., as found in the human body) are 
not patentable, the Directive does not infringe human dignity.23 The ECJ 
adopted a similar view, finding that “the protection envisaged by the 
Directive covers only the result of inventive, scientific or technical work, 
and extends to biological data existing in their natural state in human 
beings only where necessary for the achievement and exploitation of a 
particular industrial application.”24 The Court added that article 6 of the 
Directive offers additional security, because processes for cloning human 
beings, processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human 
beings, and uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes 
“are contrary to order public and morality and thus are not patentable.”25 
Moreover, the 38th recital of the Directive’s preamble clarifies that “this 
list is not exhaustive and that all the processes the use of which offend 
against human dignity are also excluded from patentability.”26
Another problem with the argument that gene patents are contrary to 
morality is that morality depends on cultural and religious beliefs, which 
are not the same in all countries and regions. Therefore, the notion of 
morality does not help explain whether gene patents should be patentable 
subject matter in those regions or countries where gene patents are seen 
 21. European Parliament Resolution, supra note 12. 
 22. The problem with that argument is that patents on genes relate directly to technical concepts, 
and only indirectly to the human body. Products and processes derived from those genes are used on 
the human body as a matter of course, but so are pharmaceutical products and medical devices. Patents 
on genes ultimately pose fewer moral concerns than property rights in human hair and blood, which 
are the subject of regular trade. Unlike the latter, patent rights on genes do not fall upon tangible 
materials but only on intangible, technical concepts. 
 23. Case C-377/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union, 2001 E.C.R.I-07079, §§ 70–75, 77–79 (2001), available at http://curia.eu.int/ 
en/content/juris/index.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2004). 
 24. Id. § 75. The applicant was supported by the Italian Republic and by the Kingdom of 
Norway. 
 25. Id. § 76. 
 26. Id. The Netherlands raised a second argument concerning human dignity, which involved the 
risk of granting patents for material obtained or derived from material obtained without prior informed 
consent by the donors and recipients. The ECJ replied that the Directive concerns only the grant of 
patents and its scope “does not therefore extend to activities before and after that grant, whether they 
involve research or the use of patented products.” Id. § 7q. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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more realistically (and, perhaps, more accurately) as mere rights in 
technical ideas. 
International standards of patent protection pose a third problem, which 
is raised by article 27.2 of the TRIPs Agreement.27 If a WTO Member 
excludes parts of the human body, even in circumstances where those 
parts are isolated from their natural environment, from patentability, under 
article 27.3(b) of the TRIPs Agreement, that member is not obliged to 
justify the exclusion or to observe certain conditions. Article 27.3(b) 
permits some inventions in the field of biotechnology to be excluded from 
patentability.28 Article 27.3(b) is, indeed, an exception to the principle of 
non-discrimination as to the field of technology, which is set by article 
27.1.29
A WTO Member may also consider genes unpatentable subject matter 
because genes are not inventions. Under an a contrario reading of article 
27.1, these members are then free to exclude them from patentability. As 
explained above, Brazil and the Andean Community have adopted this 
solution.30
If a WTO Member considers genes, as a part of the human body, not 
patentable on order public or morality grounds, article 27.2 establishes 
that such inventions may be excluded from patentability only to the extent 
that such an exclusion is necessary to prevent their commercial 
exploitation within the member’s state territory.31 Furthermore, 
“necessity” is not a subjective concept, but an objective one, the definition 
of which results from the operation of a two-step test.32 In other words, not 
all inventions protected from commercial exploitation may be excluded 
 27. See supra note 18.  
 28. TRIPs, supra note 8, art. 27.3(b). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See supra notes 19–20. Nothing prohibits WTO Members from granting patents for 
discoveries. They may not refuse patent protection for inventions (barring the exceptions explicitly 
mentioned in TRIPs arts. 27 & 73). Nothing prevents WTO Members from extending patent protection 
to other technical ideas, such as discoveries, provided such extended protection is consistent with the 
provisions of the TRIPs Agreement. Article 1.1 of the agreement serves as the controlling provision in 
this particular context. The article provides: 
Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members may, but shall not be 
obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this 
Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this 
Agreement. Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the 
provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice. 
TRIPs, supra note 8, art. 1.1. 
 31. TRIPs, supra note 8, art. 27.3. 
 32. For an explanation of the two-step necessity test, see CARVALHO, supra note 6, at 171–73. 
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from patentability. Such an exclusion is necessary to prevent the 
prohibited exploitation. 
While some opponents of gene patentability invoke reasons of human 
dignity, opponents are also concerned about limiting scientific research 
and development of new products and therapies that are distributed 
commercially. Such a position represents a clear contradiction in terms 
from a WTO viewpoint: if the problem is one of morality, then there may 
be no commercial exploitation at all. Blocking development of 
commercial products is, therefore, not a matter of concern. 
B. Establishing Exceptions to Rights Conferred by Gene Patents 
Other opponents of broad patenting of human genes have not suggested 
that genes should be excluded from patentability. In contrast, they have 
proposed mitigating the standards of legal protection for the corresponding 
patents. 
The Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 200233 
contains three limitations to rights conferred by gene patents: (a) a 
research exemption, under which “individuals who use patented genetic 
sequence information for non-commercial purposes” would be exempted 
from patent infringement;34 (b) a liability exemption, under which 
“medical practitioners utilizing genetic diagnostic tests” would be 
exempted from patent infringement liability;35 and (c) the requirement of 
“public disclosure of genomic sequence information contained within a 
patent application when federal funds were used in the development of the 
invention. The data would be released within 30 days of patent filing.”36
 33. H.R. 3967, supra note 10. 
 34. Statement of Hon. Rivers, supra note 10. Hon. Rivers justified this exemption on the ground 
that  
[c]ontrary to the understanding of many scientists, patent law does not protect from patent 
infringement scientists doing basic, fundamental, non-commercial research when they use 
patented tools, techniques and materials. Surveys performed by researchers at Stanford 
University have shown that many universities and hospitals are avoiding promising genetic 
research areas because of patent infringement concerns. Another study published earlier this 
year in the Journal of the American Medical Association found that a majority of geneticists 
are being denied access to colleagues’ data. 
Id. 
 35. Id. Hon. Rivers informs that this section builds on a provision in patent law “which exempts 
health care providers from patent infringement suits when they use a patented medical or surgical 
procedure.” Id. She referred to 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (1996), which exempts medical practitioners and 
health care entities from liability for patent infringement covering therapeutic methods for which 
applications were filed on or after September 30, 1996.  
 36. Id. 
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A report on the impact of biotechnology on healthcare for the Canadian 
Province of Ontario suggests a similar approach.37 The Report suggests 
that Canada should review its Patent Act with respect to gene patents and 
that the role of patents in supporting industry should be recognized, but 
“appropriate safeguards and protections for healthcare, medical 
practitioners and researchers” should be established.38 In particular, 
healthcare professionals and institutions, when using genetic materials for 
research purposes and in providing care, should be shielded from legal 
action (or even the threat thereof) pertaining to patented genes or DNA 
sequences. This “would not allow one gene patent to, in effect, control 
future subsequent medical use of that gene sequence or portion thereof.”39
A different solution has been proposed by Deborah Leonard, the 
president-elect of the U.S. Association of Molecular Pathologists. In an 
interview with The Scientist she suggested that, in addition to exempting 
researchers from liability, it is possible to require physicians be licensed to 
use gene patents.40
The American College of Medical Genetics (ACMG) favors limiting 
patent rights on gene-related inventions. ACMG’s position on gene patents 
is that: (a) “genes and their mutations are naturally occurring substances 
that should not be patented;” (b) “patents on genes with clinical 
implications must be very broadly licensed;” and (c) “licensing 
agreements should not limit access through excessive royalties and other 
unreasonable terms.”41
The view that patents for genes should continue to be issued subject to 
limitations conceals an underlying assumption that patents are a necessary 
evil. In other words, patents are necessary because they promote technical 
creativity, but they are socially inconvenient because they establish 
commercial monopolies. As the argument goes, patents represent an 
exclusive right to sell the subject of the invention or the products 
embodying, directly or indirectly, this subject. Monopolies entail high 
 37. Genetics, Testing and Gene Patenting: Charting New Territory in Healthcare, January 2002, 
Ontario (Canada), available at http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/public/pub/ministry_reports/ 
geneticsrep02/report_e____ (last visited Apr. 18, 2004). 
 38. Id. at 23. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Bunk, supra note 12. The idea of using compulsory licenses to diminish gene patent rights 
has received support among commentators. See Loon, supra note 6, at 413; Rimmer, supra note 11, at 
31–33 (suggesting that the Australian Patent Law should be revised to ensure the experimental use 
exemption be available to medical researchers, as well as immunizing physicians performing surgical 
procedures and medical diagnostics against liability). Rimmer also proposes that compulsory licenses 
should be made available in the field of genetic diagnostics and tests. Id. 
 41. See supra note 14. 
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prices, a reduced number of offers, and social deadweight. Where patents 
(read “monopolies”) are associated with technology essential to the well 
being of humans—as gene patents certainly are—the argument that patents 
promote the social exclusion of those in need becomes even stronger. 
Moreover, patents bar access to protected technology, during their 
respective terms, for the scientific community and commercial 
competitors.  
As will be shown in Part III, nothing could be further from the truth. 
But that line of thought is not a recent one. Thomas Jefferson, as quoted 
by Justice Clark in Graham v. Deere,42 acknowledged the difficulty in 
“drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public the 
embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not.”43 In 
Justice Clark’s view, Jefferson’s statement provided “the underlying 
policy of the patent system.”44
Recently, some commentators have adopted similar views. They 
believe that patents on genes are an embarrassment, so governments must 
impose some limit on rights they confer in order to reduce inconvenience 
without discouraging invention and innovation in the biotechnology 
industry. John M. Golden, for example, condemns patent law when it 
reaches “subject matter traditionally reserved for the public domain of 
natural science, [because] patent law risks creating obstacles to future 
research and invention without adding proportionately to the actual 
motivations of those who do the inventing.”45 However, Golden accepts 
that “biotechnology patent optimists” may have a case: “[t]he conclusion 
that patent law may impede innovation must be balanced by an 
understanding of how it can and does facilitate it.”46
Another application of Jefferson’s argument can be found in Michael 
Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg’s paper on the anticommons tragedy of the 
fragmentation of biotechnology inventions through patenting.47 According 
to Heller and Eisenberg, “[b]y conferring monopolies in discoveries, 
patents necessarily increase prices and restrict use—a cost society pays to 
motivate invention and disclosure.”48
 42. Graham v. Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
 43. Id. at 9. 
 44. Id. at 10. 
 45. Golden, supra note 6, at 110. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See generally Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? 
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998). 
 48. Id. at 699.  
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Heller and Eisenberg seem to ignore the fact that thousands of patents 
are issued every year for processes that aim only to reduce costs of 
production and, consequently, to reduce the price of products. Thousands 
of patents are also issued for products that are not entirely new but that 
contain new features that make them more useful than existing products, 
with which they will compete on the market at the same price. In other 
words, patents for inventions that compete with already existing 
technology sometimes reduce, rather than increase, prices. If, however, 
Heller and Eisenberg were focused on breakthrough inventions, they 
overlooked the fact that patents on new technology do not raise prices. For 
something to be raised, the sine qua non condition requires that the thing 
already exists. A new price can be higher only in comparison with a 
previously established price. But a new invention has no pre-existing price 
that the invention could raise. The same logic applies to restricting the use 
of an invention that was not previously available—such a restriction is 
materially impossible. Of course, Heller and Eisenberg might wish to 
compare the effects of raising prices and restricting the use of patented 
inventions with the prices and the free use of the same inventions if not 
patented. This comparison fails because it ignores the reality that, in many 
cases, private companies would not invest their money in developing 
inventions if they did not envision the possibility of filing for and 
obtaining a patent. 
The different solutions that have been proposed for overcoming the 
inconveniences of gene patents pose their own set of problems. The first 
problem lies in the incorrect assumption that patents are an economic evil. 
Part III illustrates the fallacy of this assumption. On the contrary, patents 
are useful and efficient metering devices. If gene patents cause troubles, 
then there may be a problem with the application of the patent system 
rather than with the patent system itself. 
The second problem is a legal one. Patents generate property rights, 
and tampering with these property rights through exceptions or 
compulsory licenses diminishes their value as private assets. Accordingly, 
the TRIPs Agreement establishes a prohibition against discrimination in 
the acquisition and enjoyment of patent rights in the field of technology.49
Therefore, H.R. 3967’s proposed exceptions to rights conferred 
violates TRIPs obligations of the United States.50 The research exemption 
might not conflict with the TRIPs Agreement per se because article 30 has 
 49. TRIPs, supra note 8, art. 27.1. 
 50. H.R. 3967, supra note 10. 
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language that seems to allow for it.51 Indeed, a vast number of WTO 
Members accept the research exemption and a WTO Panel Report, without 
judging the merit of such an exemption, has mentioned such a general 
practice as an example of an article 30-type exception.52 H.R. 3967 
indicates that such an exemption is to be granted in the field of genomic 
research only, which clearly discriminates against that field.53 On the other 
hand, it is true that the United States is free to exclude plants and animals 
(including the human body and parts thereof) from patentability.54 
However, the U.S. Patent Act55 does not do so and, therefore, its 
protection of genomic inventions, which is more extensive than required 
by the TRIPS Agreement, must “not contravene the provisions of [the] 
Agreement,” as provided by article 1.1.56 Therefore, protection that goes 
beyond the minimum standards of the TRIPs Agreement may not 
discriminate against the technology field.57 Interestingly, Hon. Rivers, 
when justifying her submission of H.R. 3967, mentioned that doctors are 
exempt from liability for patent infringement for therapeutic and surgical 
methods.58 The 1996 provision she referenced was introduced under 
protest from the General Counsel of the United States Trade 
Representative Office because it was discriminatory and possibly 
infringed TRIPs obligations.59
The requirement of disclosure of government-funded genomic 
inventions might raise fewer problems of discrimination because of the 
narrower scope of the measure. Nonetheless, it clearly discriminates 
against government-funded genomic inventions, as compared with 
government-funded inventions in other fields of technology. Moreover, 
the period of secrecy of patent applications has a practical purpose: it 
permits inventors to prospect the market and select foreign countries 
where they will claim the same invention. Earlier disclosure of the 
 51. TRIPs, supra note 8, art. 30. “Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive 
rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent 
owner, taking account of the legitimate interest of third parties.” Id. 
 52. See CARVALHO, supra note 6, at 220–29. 
 53. H.R. 3967, supra note 10. 
 54. TRIPs, supra note 8, art. 27.3(b). 
 55. 35 U.S.C. 101 (2002). 
 56. TRIPs, supra note 8, art. 1.1. 
 57. Regarding implementation of the TRIPs Agreement, the principle “quid facit id quod plus 
est, facit id quod minus est” does not apply. CARVALHO, supra note 6, at 57.  
 58. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2002). 
 59. Id. at 176. See statement of Hon. Rivers, supra note 10. 
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invention, or of part of it, may reduce the “headstart” economic advantage 
of pioneer inventions. 
The idea of blanket compulsory licenses of gene patents is at odds with 
articles 27.1 and 31 of the TRIPs Agreement. Under article 31(a), the grant 
of compulsory licenses “shall be considered on its individual merits.”60 
Similarly, under article 31(b), the prospective licensee must seek a 
voluntary license from the patent owner, on “reasonable commercial 
terms,” before any application for a compulsory license may be 
examined.61 The only exceptions are for cases of “national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-
commercial use,” or if the license-seeker has not been successful “within a 
reasonable period of time.”62
Likewise, ACMG’s suggestion that gene patent owners should be 
obliged to license their patents is in conflict with articles 27.163 and 28.2 
of the TRIPs Agreement.64 ACMG’s idea is parallel to the notion of the 
anticommons in genomic patenting because gene-related technology is 
prone to fragmenting. Fragmenting occurs either with regard to the nature 
of the claims (where the same gene may be fragmented into partial 
stretches of DNA—the ESTs) or with regard to the nature of the rights 
(several patents may cover different areas of technology necessary to 
produce a single product or process). It is a natural consequence of gene 
patenting that different patent owners will generate several layers of 
licensing agreements, each with a narrow scope, which increases 
transaction costs to unbearably high levels. Heller & Eisenberg illustrate 
this point persuasively when they suggest that “[p]olicy-makers should 
 60. TRIPs, supra note 8, art. 31(a) 
 61. Id. at art. 31(b). 
 62. Ng-Loy Loon notes that the use of compulsory licenses and dependency licenses 
“contravenes the current provisions of the TRIPs Agreement . . . however attractive and sensible this 
compromise [the use of compulsory licenses and dependency licenses] may be,” the compromise 
“contravenes the current provision [of] the TRIPs agreement.” Loon, supra note 6, at 413–14. 
Moreover, it is difficult to understand how a system of compulsory licenses that is blindfolded and 
does not look at the particular circumstances of each case is attractive and sensible. Indeed, such a 
blanket regime benefits not only downstream academic researchers, but also commercial competitors 
in pursuit of private gains. Furthermore, it would not encourage investment in genetic research.  
 63. Patent owners in other fields of technology do not have the same constraints on licensing 
rights. TRIPs, supra note 8, art. 27.1. 
 64. Art. 28.2 of the TRIPs Agreement reads: “Patent owners shall have the right to assign, or 
transfer by succession, the patent and to conclude licensing contracts.” Id. art. 28.2. The language of 
article 28.2 contrasts with the language of article 21 regarding the licensing and assignment of 
trademarks. Article 21 states “[m]embers may determine conditions on the licensing and assignment of 
trademarks . . . .” Because article 28.2 does not contain similar language, it appears that members may 
not impose conditions on patent licensing other than those permitted by articles 8.2 and 40 (prohibition 
of patent misuse and anticompetitive licensing clauses). 
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seek to ensure coherent boundaries of upstream patents and to minimize 
restrictive licensing practices that interfere with downstream product 
development.”65
C. Adopting Special Criteria for Assessing the Conditions of Gene 
Patentability 
Commentators have also suggested that gene patent applications should 
be subject to greater scrutiny with regard to the conditions of patentability, 
particularly utility.66 This suggestion raises two issues: (i) whether the 
conditions of patentability can be used to differentiate DNA sequences 
(and other elements of genomic technology) from products of nature; and 
(ii) how to establish that gene claims do not represent abstract, scientific 
concepts but are indeed useful to produce goods and services. 
DNA sequences (or fragments thereof) are discoveries to the extent 
they represent nucleotide pairs in the same order and configuration as they 
exist in their natural environment, the human cell. Discoveries (naturally 
occurring materials or scientific theories) are not patentable as a matter of 
law. This concept is absolute in many countries,67 but differs in the legal 
language and practices in the European Union and in the United States. 
 65. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 701. 
 66. See, e.g., Loon, supra note 6; Golden, supra note 6; John M. Conley & Roberte Makowski, 
Back to the Future: Rethinking the Product of Nature Doctrine as a Barrier to Biotechnology Patents 
(Part III), 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 398 (2003); Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The 
Ethics of Patenting DNA—A Discussion Paper 71 (2002), available at 
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/filelibrary/pdf/theethicsofpatentingdna.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 
2004). “We consider . . . that, in general, the granting of patents which assert rights over DNA 
sequences as research tools should be discouraged . . . . We take the view that the best way to 
discourage the award of such patents is by a stringent application of the criteria for patenting, 
particularly that of utility.” Id. 
 67. Section 1(3) of the International United Bureaus for the Protection of Intellectual Property 
[BIRPI]’s Model Law for Developing Countries on Inventions establishes that “Principles and 
discoveries of a scientific nature shall not be considered to be inventions.” BIRPI Publication No. 
801(E), 1968. BIRPI administered the Paris and Berne Conventions until 1970 and preceded WIPO. 
Because many developing countries have followed that Model, the language quoted above is still 
found in several national statutes. The Model Law is no longer used by WIPO in its legislative 
assistance. The language on the patentability of discoveries for developing countries that the WIPO 
Secretariat currently suggests to its developing country Member States is the following: 
1.(1) For the purposes of this Act, “patent of invention” means the title granted to protect an 
invention. 
(2)(a) For the purposes of this Act, “invention” means an idea of an inventor which permits in 
practice the solution to a specific problem in the field of technology. 
. . . 
(3) The following, even if they are inventions within the meaning of subsection (2), shall be 
excluded from patent protection: 
discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods;. . . 
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Under the European Directive on Biotechnological Inventions, 
“[b]iological material which is isolated from its natural environment or 
produced by means of a technical process may be [the] subject of an 
invention even if it previously occurred in nature.”68 The simple discovery 
of one element of the human body, such as the sequence or partial 
sequence of a gene, is not a patentable invention.69 But “[a]n element 
isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a 
technical process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, 
may constitute a patentable invention, even if the structure of that element 
is identical to that of a natural element,”70 provided “[t]he industrial 
application of a sequence or a partial sequence of a gene [is] disclosed in 
the patent application.”71
Therefore, the European Directive provides that genes must comply 
with two conditions in order to be patentable: (a) they must be isolated 
from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a technical 
process (for example, they must be purified or synthesized);72 and (b) their 
industrial application must be known to the inventor (and described in the 
application).73 Isolated, purified or synthesized genes may be patentable 
even if they are identical to those that exist in the human body.74
These two conditions must exist for genes to be considered inventions 
rather than discoveries.75 The Community’s legal framework on 
biotechnological inventions is limited to laying down certain principles, 
such as those “intended in particular to determine the difference between 
inventions and discoveries with regard to the patentability of certain 
elements of human origin . . . .”76 Thus,  
an element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced is 
not excluded from patentability since it is, for example, the result of 
technical processes used to identify, purify and classify it and to 
reproduce it outside the human body, techniques which human 
The text of the draft provisions on industrial property that WIPO uses in its activities of cooperation 
with developing countries are available at http://www.wipo.int. 
 68. Council Directive 98/44, art. 3.2, 1998 O.J. (L213) 18 (European Directive on the Legal 
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions) [hereinafter “European Directive”]. 
 69. Id. art. 5.1. 
 70. Id. art. 5.2. 
 71. Id. art. 5.3. 
 72. Id. art. 3.2. 
 73. Id. art. 5.3. 
 74. Id. art. 5.2. 
 75. Id. at pmbl. 
 76. Id. at Rec. 13. 
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beings alone are capable of putting into practice and which nature is 
incapable of accomplishing by itself.77
Without addressing the intricate distinction between an isolated or 
purified gene and a gene in its natural environment, the artificiality of the 
former separates, in board terms, an invention from a discovery. To simply 
state that inventions are novel, creative, and practical solutions for 
technical problems does not distinguish products of nature from inventions 
because nature often creates such novel solutions.78 What actually 
distinguishes an invention from a discovery or product of nature is 
authorship. Inventions are human-made, while discoveries are nature-
made, as the Supreme Court noted in Diamond v. Chakrabarty79 where it 
stated that, “Congress thus realized that the relevant distinction was not 
between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, 
whether living or not, and human-made inventions. Here, respondent’s 
microorganism is the result of human ingenuity and research.”80
The European Directive attributes human authorship to genes that are 
isolated from their natural environment. It does not attribute patentability 
to the methods of isolating or purifying genes, but to the genes 
themselves.81 Therefore, in light of the Directive, genes borrow 
patentability from the artificial methods of their isolation and 
purification.82 Novelty and inventiveness of isolated genes are extrinsic to 
the genes because they are intrinsic to the methods of their isolation and 
purification.83 More specifically, patentability of isolated materials arises 
from indirect human intervention. The element of artificiality is found in 
the processes and methods of isolation, not in the isolated or purified 
genes themselves, because the genetic composition remains the same as in 
their natural environment. Although the reasoning is uncommon, the 
Directive clearly takes a position in favor of gene patents, regardless of the 
fact that patent rights will be enforced in regard to the genes themselves 
and not the respective processes of obtaining them. 
 77. Id. at Rec. 21. See Derek Wood, European Patents for Biotechnological Inventions—Past, 
Present and Future, 23 World Pat. Inf. 339 (2001) (describing generally the European Directive). 
 78. See ERIC LAITHWAITE, AN INVENTOR IN THE GARDEN OF EDEN (1994) (elaborating on 
nature’s ingenuity in finding solutions for technical problems). 
 79. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980). 
 80. Id. 
 81. European Directive, supra note 68. 
 82. Id. art. 5.2. 
 83. The same observation has been made regarding patentability of known substances for which 
a new pharmaceutical use is found. In that case, the argument is that the known substances borrow 
their novelty from the new uses and thus become patentable subject matter. See CARVALHO, supra 
note 6, at 149–50. 
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In spite of the different language used in the analogous United States 
statute, the legal solution adopted by the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) is identical. Actually, the United States Patent 
code establishes that inventions or discoveries are patentable subject 
matter.84 It defines the term “invention” as “invention or discovery.”85 
Because discoveries are findings or disclosures of what is concealed in 
nature,86 they are considered non-statutory subject matter. Therefore, one 
must distinguish between those discoveries that are non-statutory subject 
matter, and hence, non-patentable, and those discoveries to which the 
patent code refers. 
This view was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Parker v. Flook.87 The Court held that a method for updating alarm limits 
was not patentable subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act because its 
only novel feature was a mathematical formula.88 The Court stated: 
The rule that the discovery of a law of nature cannot be patented 
rests . . . on the more fundamental understanding that they are not 
the kind of “discoveries” that the statute was enacted to protect. The 
obligation to determine what type of discovery is sought to be 
patented must precede the determination of whether that discovery 
is, in fact, new or obvious.89
As the Court stated in Parker, the notions of novelty and obviousness 
are not useful for distinguishing between patentable and non-patentable 
discoveries.90 Yet, this distinction must be made before assessing these 
other conditions of patentability. Interestingly, the Supreme Court did not 
mention the third condition of patentability: usefulness or utility. This 
 84. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952) provides: “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 
may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 
 85. 35 U.S.C. § 100 (1952). 
 86. “This is not to suggest that 101 has no limits or that it embraces every discovery. The laws of 
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable.” Diamond v. 
Chrakabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citations omitted). 
 87. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 593 (footnotes omitted). 
 90. Id. at 588. The United States Supreme Court attempted to distinguish between discoveries 
and inventions by differentiating their technical nature: “A new process is usually the result of 
discovery; a machine, of invention.” Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267 (1854). “The patent of 
Burden alleges no discovery of a new process, but only that he has invented a machine, and, therefore, 
correctly states the nature of his invention.” Id. at 269. The issue at bar was the alleged infringement of 
a patent, hence the need for interpreting the scope of the claims and assessing whether they covered a 
machine only or whether they extended to the process of using that machine. The court concluded that 
the patent only covered the machine, not the process of using it. Id. 
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omission might lead to the conclusion that utility, in contrast with novelty 
and non-obviousness, may distinguish a statutory discovery from a non-
statutory one. This reasoning, in fact, was the main argument the USPTO 
used when responding to specific comments on the revised Interim Utility 
Examination Guidelines: 
[A]n inventor’s discovery of a gene can be the basis for a patent on 
the genetic composition isolated from its natural state and processed 
through purifying steps that separate the gene from other molecules 
naturally associated with it. 
 If a patent application discloses only nucleic acid molecular 
structure for a newly discovered gene, and no utility for the claimed 
isolated gene, the claimed invention is not patentable. But when the 
inventor also discloses how to use the purified gene isolated from its 
natural state, the application satisfies the “utility” requirement. That 
is, where the application discloses a specific, substantial, and 
credible utility for the claimed isolated and purified gene, the 
isolated and purified gene composition may be patentable.91
The position of the USPTO (as well as of the European Directive) 
strongly emphasizes the manner in which patent applications are drafted. 
This emphasis may “have extinguished the [product of nature] doctrine as 
a plausible objection to almost any kind of biotechnology claim.”92 Words 
like “isolated” and “purified,” if associated with a particular utility, 
become the relevant factors of patentability, as both the European 
Directive93 and the USPTO Guidelines94 seem to acknowledge.95 It is 
worth noting that such an emphasis on claim drafting has already been 
disallowed by the United States Supreme Court in unequivocal terms. In 
Parker v. Flook96 the Court rejected such an argument, stating: 
if a process application implements a principle in some specific 
fashion, it automatically falls within the patentable subject matter of 
§ 101 and the substantive patentability of the particular process can 
then be determined by the conditions of §§ 102 and 103. This 
 91. United States Patent and Trademark Office, Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 
1092, 1093 (2001). 
 92. Conly & Maskowski, supra note 66, at 379. 
 93. European Directive, supra note 68. 
 94. Supra note 91. 
 95. Very suggestively, Conley & Makowski say that these words have received “talismanic 
status” and have, thus, become a sort of “incantation.” Conley & Makowski, supra note 66, at 392. 
 96. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978). 
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assumption . . . would make the determination of patentable subject 
matter depend simply on the draftsman’s art and would ill serve the 
principles underlying the prohibition against patents for “ideas” or 
phenomena of nature.97
The idea of using the utility element as the sole test of invention (or of 
statutory discovery) was rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in McClain v. 
Ortmayer, which was a case of patent infringement.98 In this case, the 
defendant contested one of the allegedly infringed patents based on lack of 
invention.99 The plaintiff argued that the particular patent’s strong 
commercial success fulfilled the prevailing test of invention.100 The Court 
rejected that argument because commercial success is frequently the 
product of extensive and judicious advertising, not of the intrinsic merits 
of the articles themselves.101 Thus, commercial success is not necessarily 
synonymous with utility for the purposes of the Patent Act. More 
importantly, the Court added language that clarifies its reasoning 
regarding mandatory patentability requirements. The Court stated: 
Counsel for the plaintiff in the case under consideration has argued 
most earnestly that the only practical test of invention is the effect 
of the device upon the useful arts, in other words, that utility is the 
sole test of invention. . . . He cited in this connection certain English 
cases, which go far to support his contention. These cases, however, 
must not be construed in such a way as to control the language of 
our statute, which limits the benefits of patent laws to things which 
are new as well as useful. 
. . . We do not care to inquire how far [the second patent] was 
anticipated by the various devices put in evidence, showing the use 
of a similar spring for analogous purposes, since we are satisfied 
that a mere severance of the double spring does not involve 
invention, at least in the absence of conclusive evidence that the 
single spring performs some new and important function not 
performed by it in the prior patent.102  
Utility alone is not sufficient to determine patentability. A device is 
patentable when, as compared to prior art, it performs a new and important 
 97. Id. at 593. 
 98. McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419 (1891). 
 99. Id. at 425, 426. 
 100. Id. at 427. 
 101. Id. at 428. 
 102. Id. at 427, 429 (emphasis added). 
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function not performed by devices that constitute prior art. Only when 
utility is thus qualified does the invention overcome the product of nature 
barrier to patentability. It is necessary that the practical function which the 
claimed invention performs be distinct from the function performed by the 
emulated natural product. 
By the same token, the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chkarabarty103 
deemed a modified bacterium patentable. The Court noted that “the 
patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different 
characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential for 
significant utility. His discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own; 
accordingly it is patentable subject matter under § 101.”104 A bacterium, 
therefore, is statutory patentable subject matter when, cumulatively: (a) it 
has “markedly different characteristics from any found in nature”); (b) it is 
useful (effectively or potentially); and (c) the inventive activity can be 
directly attributed to the inventor and not to the nature.105
Under Diamond, isolated, purified and synthesized genes are not 
statutory patentable subject matter because, when isolated from the human 
body, they maintain identical106 or very similar characteristics to those 
found in nature. It follows that purified and synthesized genes are also not 
patentable because they realize exactly the same function that genes 
inserted in their natural environment perform.  
However, as noted above, this article does not intend to revisit the 
product of nature doctrine.107 The utility requirement in the field of 
biotechnology has been scrutinized with greater care as a consequence of 
gene patenting. This increased scrutiny assumes a stronger utility 
requirement will allow commercial development without hindering 
scientific research.108
 103. Diamond v. Chakrabaty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980). 
 104. Id. at 310. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See also European Directive, supra note 77, art. 5.2 and accompanying text; Wood, supra 
note 77. 
 107. Conley & Makowski argue that, if revisited, the product of nature doctrine, as established by 
the Supreme Court, might greatly narrow the granting of gene patents if it were revisited. See Conley 
& Makowski, supra note 66, at 391–93. 
 108. See, e.g., Loon, supra note 6. Similarly, Golden proposes that “to ensure that the 
biotechnology industry’s success continues, existing patent law doctrines, and in particular the utility 
requirement for patentability, must be carefully construed and enforced.” He adds that the USPTO and 
courts should use the utility requirement “to impose real, albeit non insurmountable, obstacles to the 
patenting of genetic sequences.” Golden, supra note 6, at 112. See also M. Scott McBride, 
Patentability of Human Genes: Our Patent System Can Address the Issues Without Modification, 85 
MARQ. L. REV. 511, 528 (2001). 
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Actually, resorting to the conditions of patentability in order to address 
eventual problems arising from patenting genes, unlike proposals to 
tamper with the rights granted by gene patents may be consistent with the 
TRIPs Agreement. Imposing the conditions of patentability of genes 
differently from conditions for other fields of technology may constitute 
prohibited discrimination.109 On the other hand, patent law is clearly 
industry-specific to the extent that claimed inventions are submitted to 
patent offices in different forms that are compatible with the specific 
nature of the technology to which they belong.110 For example, United 
States Patent Code111 does not require that plants be described in the same 
full, clear, concise and exact terms as required for inventions in general: 
where the description of plants “is as complete as is reasonably possible,” 
the respective patents shall not be declared invalid for lack of enabling 
disclosure.112 The European Directive states that where an invention 
concerns biological material that is not available to the public and that 
cannot be fully described in a patent application,113 the patent may be 
granted nonetheless if the biological material has been deposited under the 
Budapest Treaty.114
Disparate treatment of patent applications helps patent offices assess 
whether patent applications in certain fields meet the conditions of 
patentability, and does not affect the protection of patent rights. The 
differences comply with the TRIPs Agreement,115 because they represent 
the legal systems and practices of WTO Members in implementing TRIPS 
obligations.116
 109. TRIPs, supra note 8, art. 27.1. 
 110. See generally Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, 
U.C. BERKELEY PUB. L. Res. Paper No. 125, U. MINN. PUB. L. Res. Paper Series, Research Paper No. 
03-5 (Mar. 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=303619 (last visited Mar. 11, 2004). 
 111. 35 U.S.C. § 172 (2000). 
 112. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
 113. European Directive, supra note 68, art. 13. 
 114. Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the 
Purposes of Patent Procedure, Apr. 28, 1977, 32 U.S.T. 1241, 1861 U.N.T.S. 361 (as amended Sept. 
26, 1980) [hereinafter Budapest Treaty]. The Budapest Treaty is administered by the International 
Bureau of WIPO. It does not define microorganisms, therefore some of its Parties have extended it to 
other biological materials, such as cells and cell lines. See generally Nuno Piers de Carvalho, The 
Budapest Treaty and its Applicability to Human Stem Lines; the WIPO Approach on Ethical Issues, in 
THE EUROPEAN GROUP ON ETHICS IN SCIENCE AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES TO THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, OPINION ON THE ETHICAL ASPECTS OF PATENTING INVENTIONS INVOLVING HUMAN 
STEM CELLS, Opinion No. 16, 99 (Nov. 20, 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
european_group_ethics/docs/avis16_en_complet.pdf (last visted Mar. 12, 2004).  
 115. TRIPs, supra note 8, art. 1.1. 
 116. See TRIPs, supra note 8, art. 29.1. 
Members shall require that an applicant for a patent shall disclose the invention in a manner 
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The same can be said about conditions of patentability. The TRIPS 
Agreement does not define the three conditions of patentability. Thus, 
WTO Members are presumptively free to follow their own practices in 
that regard.117 The only condition is that national practices must not 
discriminate as to the availability of patent protection and the rights 
enjoyed therefrom. Utility, therefore, should be considered an assessment 
of patentability and not an obstacle to patentability. As a matter of course, 
a patent application in a technical field with inherent utility is not 
necessarily required to reference that condition. Indeed, such a reference 
could be redundant. Nevertheless, it is reasonable for patent offices to 
request that applicants state the practical purpose of their alleged invention 
in the field of biotechnology, and particularly in the field of genes, because 
so many patent applications have been filed for DNA sequences that have 
no known purpose.118
II. THE CONDITION OF ALTERNATIVENESS OF INVENTIONS AND THE 
RATIONALE OF THE PRODUCT OF NATURE DOCTRINE 
The product of nature doctrine, namely that products of nature and 
scientific principles and rules are not patentable subject matter, is well 
established and deeply embedded in patent law.119 However, its boundaries 
may not be well defined. From a purely legal perspective, the scope of 
patentability depends ultimately, and exclusively, on the will of Congress. 
More fundamental questions then arise: why are products of nature not 
sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art 
and may require the applicant to indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention known 
to the inventor at the filing date or, where priority is claimed, at the priority date of the 
application. 
Id. 
 117. TRIPs, supra note 8, art. 27.1. See CARVALHO, supra note 6, at 58. 
 118. The WIPO Secretariat has acknowledged that the condition of utility may apply to the 
biotechnological field in a specific manner: 
For example, with respect to an invention concerning a gene sequence that produces a protein, 
not only which protein is produced, but also the function or utility of the protein should be 
disclosed in order to meet the requirement of industrial applicability. In this case, a decisive 
question raised is not whether a gene sequence concerned can be isolated (i.e., “an invention 
can be made or used” in the field of biotechnology), but whether that gene sequence has a 
practical or useful application. It may also be noted, however, that this approach does not 
appear to be applied to the same extent to all categories of inventions. 
See Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, World Intellectual Property Organization, “Industrial 
Applicability” and “Utility” Requirements: Commonalities and Differences, 9 (Mar. 17, 2003) at 
http://www.wipo.int/scplen/documents/session_9/pdf/scp9_5.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2004).  
 119. See e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 
(1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 64 (1972); Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 
U.S. 127 (1948); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852). 
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patentable subject matter? What is the rationale of the product of nature 
doctrine? 
In reality, the trend is to assume that products of nature are not 
patentable without further inquiry into the underlying rationale. For 
example, a commentator has mentioned that the patent law in the area of 
biotechnology has extended “to subject matter traditionally reserved for 
the public domain of natural science.”120 Another commentator has noted 
that the non-patentability of scientific discoveries expresses a “bias against 
basic research.”121 The Commissioner of Patents said in 1889 that granting 
patents on “the trees of the forest and the plants of the earth . . . would be 
unreasonable and impossible.”122
Certainly none of these views explain the reasons for barring products 
of nature from patentability. This bar may simply represent a tradition in 
patent law. But what is the logic behind such a tradition? It may be 
intuitive that scientific discoveries are not patentable, but where does that 
intuition stem from? Indeed, patent law may be biased against scientific 
research—but, absent a frivolous bias, what is the reason behind the 
discrimination? It may sound unreasonable to grant patents on the trees of 
the forest and on the plants of the earth, but why exactly is that 
unreasonable?  
The U.S. Supreme Court has defined the product of nature doctrine as 
follows: “[t]he qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, 
electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of 
knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to 
all men and reserved exclusively to none.”123 But why are manifestations 
of laws of nature free to all men? The reason is that effective operation of 
the patent system depends on the limited grant of patents. Patents should 
be granted only for those new, non-obvious and useful inventions or 
discoveries that provide alternatives to existing technology that can be 
alter-invented.124  
 120. Golden, supra note 6, at 110 (emphasis added). 
 121. Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 457 
(1969). 
 122. Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm’r. Pat. 123, 126 (1889). 
 123. Funk Brothers Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130. 
 124. The term “alter-invention” can be contrasted with “reinvention,” which means to invent again 
the same technical solution that had already been invented. To alter-invent is to invent a different, non-
overlapping and non-equivalent solution for the same technical problem. Alter-inventions may be 
entirely different, or they may be careful variations of the original invention designed to avoid 
infringement (“inventing around”). Alter-inventions compete with the original inventions. This term 
will be used, for the purposes of this article, to describe the “condition of alternativeness of 
inventions.” 
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The condition of alternativeness of inventions was first articulated by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Le Roy v. Tatham125 and was invoked 
subsequently in O’Reilly v. Morse126 and Corning v. Burden.127 
Additionally, although not mentioned explicitly, the condition of 
alternativeness undergirds the Court’s opinions in Funk Brothers Seed. Co. 
v. Kalo Inoculant Co.128 and Diamond v. Chakrabarty.129
In Le Roy, the Supreme Court examined allegations of patent 
infringement for a machine that improved upon an earlier patented 
machine. In the allegedly improved machine, lead pipes were “wrought 
under heat, by pressure and constriction, from set metal,” while the 
original invention had them cast formed in a mold.130 The circuit court had 
instructed the jury that the machine itself was not novel, but the practical 
application of a principle, “by which a useful article of manufacture is 
produced, and wrought pipe made as distinguished from cast pipe.”131 The 
Court held that the instruction was erroneous because the patent did not 
claim the practical application of the principle, only the machine’s 
features. The novelty of those features was a question of material fact for 
the jury to decide.132 The Court stated the condition of alternativeness of 
inventions for the first time when discussing how patent law addresses the 
issues of patentability of principles of nature:  
It is admitted that a principle is not patentable. A principle, in the 
abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these 
cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an 
exclusive right. Nor can an exclusive right exist to a new power, 
should one be discovered in addition to those already known. 
Through the agency of machinery a new steam power may be said 
to have been generated. But no one can appropriate this power 
exclusively to himself, under the patent laws. The same may be said 
of electricity, and any [the] of other powers in nature, which is alike 
open to all, and may be applied to useful purposes by the use of 
machinery. 
 125. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852). 
 126. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853). 
 127. Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252 (1854). 
 128. Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
 129. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 130. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 172 (1852). 
 131. Id. at 174. 
 132. Id. at 177. 
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In all such cases, the processes used to extract, modify, and 
concentrate natural agencies, constitute the invention. The elements 
of the power exist; the invention is not in discovering them, but in 
applying them to useful objects. Whether the machinery used be 
novel, or consist of a new combination of parts known, the right of 
the inventor is secured against all who use the same mechanical 
power, or one that shall be substantially the same. 
A patent is not good for an effect, or the result of a certain process, 
as that would prohibit all other persons from making the same thing 
by any means whatsoever. This, by creating monopolies, would 
discourage arts and manufactures, against the avowed policy of the 
patent laws.133  
Under the condition of alternativeness, as articulated by the Supreme 
Court, patents cannot be granted on ideas or on knowledge that other 
persons cannot otherwise use. A patent grants exclusive rights in a certain 
invention; but that exclusivity may not impede other persons from using 
the same natural principle or material by different means from those 
claimed in the patent. If the patent is granted on the principle or material 
itself rather than on the use of the natural principle or material, other 
people will necessarily be barred from using that same principle or 
material, regardless of their level of ingenuity in developing different 
means. Patents on a principle or material, therefore, become monopolies 
that discourage ”the progress of science and useful arts,” a condition that 
stands in sharp conflict with the constitutional function of the patent 
system.134
In O’Reilly, the Court scrutinized and denied the validity of one of 
Morse’s patent claims on the telegraph.135 In that claim, Morse went 
beyond “the specific machinery, or parts of machinery, . . . the essence of 
[his] invention being the use of the motive power of the electric or 
galvanic current, which [he] call[ed] electromagnetism, however 
developed, for making or printing intelligible characters, letters or signs, at 
any distance[].”136 The Court noted that Morse actually claimed “the 
exclusive right to every improvement where the motive power is the 
electric or galvanic current, and the result is the marking or printing [of] 
 133. Id. at 174–75 (emphasis added). 
 134. U.S. CONST., art. I § 8, cl.8. 
 135. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 78 (1853).  
 136. Id. at 78. 
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intelligible characters, signs, or letters at a distance.”137 The Court 
acknowledged that Morse’s claim at bar was not acceptable because: 
If this claim can be maintained, it matters not by what process or 
machinery the result is accomplished. For aught that we now know 
some future inventor, in the onward march of science, may discover 
a mode of writing or printing at a distance by means of the electric 
or galvanic current, without using any part of the process or 
combination set forth in the plaintiff’s specification. His invention 
may be less complicated—less liable to get out of order—less 
expensive in construction, and in its operation. But yet if it is 
covered by this patent the inventor could not use it, nor the public 
have the benefit of it without the permission of this patentee. 
Nor is this all, while he shuts the door against inventions of other 
persons . . . . 
[I]t makes no difference, in . . . respect [of using the means the 
applicant specifies to produce the result or effect he describes, and 
nothing more], whether the effect is produced by chemical agency 
or combination; or by the application of discoveries or principles in 
natural philosophy known or unknown before his invention; or by 
machinery acting altogether upon mechanical principles. In either 
case he must describe the manner and process . . . and the end it 
accomplishes. And any one may lawfully accomplish the same end 
without infringing the patent, if he uses means substantially 
different from those described.138  
Because the telegraph as described and claimed by Morse could be 
alter-invented at any time in the future, it was undoubtedly patentable. 
However, the properties of electromagnetism were not patentable, because 
electromagnetism, as a principle of nature, is unique and can not be alter-
invented. If Morse’s claim had been allowed, he could have blocked any 
future use of electromagnetism. 
In Corning, the Court scrutinized the claims of a certain patent to 
identify whether its subject was a process or a machine.139 In concluding 
that the patent covered a machine,140 the Court said: 
 137. Id. at 112. 
 138. Id. at 113, 119 (emphasis added). The second reason the Court identified for rejecting 
Morse’s claim was that it included future applications of electromagnetism that he had not yet 
invented. Id. 
 139. Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267 (1854). 
 140. Id. at 269. 
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His patent having a title which claims a machine, and his 
specification describing a machine, to construe his claim as for the 
function, effect, or result of the machine, would certainly endanger, 
if not destroy, its validity. His claim cannot change or nullify his 
previous specification with safety to his patent. He cannot describe 
a machine which will perform a certain function, and then claim the 
function itself, and all other machines that may be invented to 
perform the same function.”141  
Thus, in Corning, the Court again took into account that the patent on the 
machine’s features allowed for it to be alter-invented by other persons, in 
contrast with a claim on the machine’s function.142
Similarly, genetic material, because it lacks the condition of 
alternativeness, should not be considered patentable subject matter. No 
one can deny that the human body is full of wonderful technical solutions 
for problems posed by its environment. The human cell is an extremely 
complex machine, and genes are merely one of its components. Genes are 
indeed technical solutions that mutation and evolution have improved. 
Genes, however, are nature-made; they are unique in the sense that they 
cannot be alter-invented by scientists to produce identical results. Any 
given protein is coded for by a single gene which is formed by a unique 
sequence of As, Cs, Gs, and Ts.143 No scientist can construe a gene 
containing a different sequence of nucleotides to produce the same protein. 
A scientist simply cannot produce an artificial gene that does not copy a 
gene created by nature. 
On the other hand, an isolated, purified and synthesized gene contains 
exactly the same DNA sequence as the gene in the human body, 
otherwise, it would not work. The scientist who isolates, purifies and 
synthesizes a gene may be praised for the method employed, but he has 
not actually invented the gene.  
To give a simple example, if a prospector develops new equipment to 
extract water from a well, what he extracts is still water (H2O), although 
“isolated” from its original environment. If a laboratory purifies that water, 
eliminating some substances from it and making it more adequate for 
human consumption, the final result will still be H2O. If that laboratory 
adds some substances to the water to make it more pleasant to the human 
taste, the combination of the water with those substances can even be the 
 141. Id. (emphasis added).  
 142. Id. 
 143. See supra note 3. 
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result of human direct intervention. But any patent issued should not claim 
water (H2O) in isolation. The issue of human genomics is curing genetic 
diseases caused by mutations in certain genes. The cure for those diseases 
is in the genes that exist now in the human body. Genes themselves cannot 
be alter-invented, and thus should not be patentable.  
As stated in Funk Brothers and Diamond, only those inventions that are 
the direct result of human intervention are statutorily patentable. 
In Funk Brothers, the Court held that packaging six different types of 
bacteria to produce a combination capable of inoculating the seeds of 
plants belonging to several cross-inoculation groups was not patentable.144 
Inoculated bacteria enable the plants to fix nitrogen. Prior to that bacteria 
combination, a farmer with different crops would need to use separate 
inoculants, one for each crop.145 The Court stated: 
Discovery of the fact that certain strains of each species of these 
bacteria can be mixed without harmful effect to the properties of 
either is a discovery of their qualities of non-inhibition. It is no 
more than the discovery of some of the handiwork of nature and 
hence is not patentable. The aggregation of select strains of the 
several species into one product is an application of that newly-
discovered natural principle. But however ingenious the discovery 
of that natural principle may have been, the application of it is 
hardly more than an advance in the packaging of the inoculants. 
Each of the species of root-nodule bacteria contained in the package 
infects the same group of leguminous plants which it always 
infected. No species acquires a different use. The combination of 
species produces no new bacteria, no change in the six species of 
bacteria and no enlargement of their range of utility. Each species 
has the effect it always had. . . . Their use in combination does not 
improve in any way their natural functioning. They serve the ends 
nature originally provided and act quite independently of any effort 
of the patentee.”146
Under Funk, DNA sequences are not patentable subject matter regardless 
of their utility identified and described in the patent application, because 
the ability of isolated and purified genes to code for certain proteins has 
always been their natural function.147 Isolated genes “serve the ends nature 
 144. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Innoculant, 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
 145. Id. at 131–32. 
 146. Id. at 131 (emphasis added). 
 147. Id. at 130. 
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originally provided” and “act quite independently of any effort of the 
patentee.”148 Moreover, genes cannot borrow patentability from the 
inventiveness of the methods used for isolating and purifying them. Under 
Funk’s rationale, “however ingenious the discovery of that natural 
principle [that a certain combination of genes codify for a certain protein] 
may have been,” the isolated gene in itself is not statutorily patentable 
subject matter. 
The Court’s opinion in Diamond also relies on the distinction between 
nature-made and man-made inventions.149 In affirming that § 101150 covers 
modified bacteria, in spite of bacteria being living things, the Court quoted 
the House and Senate Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Patent 
Act, stating that “Congress intended statutory subject matter to ‘include 
anything under the sun that is made by man.’”151 Later, the Court noted 
that “respondent’s micro-organism plainly qualifies as patentable subject 
matter. His claim is not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomena, but to a 
non-naturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter—a product 
of human ingenuity ‘having a distinctive name, character [and] use.’”152 
Putting crucial emphasis on the artificial character of the bacterium as 
modified by the patent applicant, the Court remarked that “[h]is discovery 
is not nature’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject 
matter under § 101.”153  
The handiwork of man was not in identifying the bacterium and 
isolating it from the environment, because such a bacterium would have 
the same composition as in nature and would perform exactly the same 
function.154 Instead, it was in the bacterium itself, which was new because 
its composition had been modified by the patent applicant as a result of 
incorporating four plasmids capable of degrading oil to perform a function 
that it could not accomplish in its natural state.155 The invention was in the 
bacterium itself, not in the methods used to modify and isolate bacterium.  
 148. Id. at 131. 
 149. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980). 
 150. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). 
 151. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. Rep. No. 82-1979 at 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923 
at 6 (1952)); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). 
 152. Id. (quoting Hartronft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609 (1887)). 
 153. Id. at 310. 
 154. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Innoculant, 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
 155. The Court noted: “In the work represented by the patent application at issue here, 
Chakrabarty discovered a process by which four different plasmids, capable of degrading four 
different oil components, could be transferred to and maintained stably in a single Pseudomonas 
bacterium, which itself has no capacity for degrading oil.” Id. at 305 n.1. 
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The relationship between the condition of alternativeness of inventions, 
as identified in Le Roy,156 and the principle that only directly human-made 
inventions are patentable, as established in Funk Bros., is that only the 
latter can be alter-invented.157 Contrast this with natural inventions, which 
are unique and unsusceptible to being alter-invented.158 A patent on a 
natural product leaves competitors without any alternative, because the 
natural product cannot be alter-invented.159 Human intervention can 
combine that natural product with another to produce a different result. 
Such a combination is within the patent statute because another person can 
at any time combine that same product with a different material (alter-
invent) or prepare the same combination but under a different dosage 
(invent around). 
In summary, only human-made inventions meet the standards imposed 
by the condition of alternativeness of inventions; thus only these human-
made inventions can, or should be, statutorily patentable subject matter. It 
is very important to emphasize that only directly human-made inventions 
are (or should be) patentable. Where the discoverer isolates or purifies a 
natural substance without modifying it, the condition of alternativeness is 
not met because the composition of the purified substance remains the 
same. An isolated and purified gene remains the same as in nature and 
performs only its natural function. Therefore, patentable inventions must 
meet not only the three substantive160 conditions of patentability, but also a 
fourth—alternativeness. 
 156. LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852). 
 157. Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. 127. 
 158. However, some human inventions cannot be alter-invented as a matter of law. Such cases are 
exceptional and are subject to blanket compulsory licenses. See infra notes 196–97 and accompanying 
text. But when man-made inventions are an alternative to natural creations, the inventions are 
patentable subject matter provided they are not slavish imitations or reproductions of natural 
ingredients or features. Actually, many man-made inventions are often inspired by nature and its own 
creative solutions; such a fact does not make them less patentable. Alternativeness is the key to the 
distinction between man-made copies of nature that are patentable and those that are not patentable. 
 159. Any use of that natural product depends on its availability from the patent holder. It is 
impossible to obtain artificial products that have the same or similar properties and functionality. 
 160. Substantive conditions of patentability are those requirements that concern the nature of the 
invention itself. Failure to meet those conditions is sanctioned with either rejecting the patent 
application or, if detected a posteriori, with invalidation of the patent. This is why these are more than 
simple requirements but instead constitute conditions of patentability. Substantive conditions are the 
requirements of novelty, non-obviousness and utility. This Article submits that alternativeness is a 
fourth condition of patentability. Another substantive requirement, which is not a substantive 
condition, is the unity of invention. In general, the failure to meet this requirement causes the patent 
application to be divided, not rejected, if detected during the examination of the patent application. If 
the unity of invention is detected after the patent is granted, the patent is preserved. In contrast, formal 
requirements concern the form in which the invention is submitted to prosecution. The main formal 
requirement, which is mandatory, is disclosure of the invention, which must be enabling. Failure to 
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To a certain extent, the term “condition of alternativeness of 
inventions” is redundant because the notions of inventions and 
alternativeness overlap, except for inventions that are transformed ex post 
facto into technical standards.161 Only inventions (i.e., human-made 
technical solutions) can meet the condition of alternativeness; creations of 
nature cannot. However, the same can be said about non-obviousness, as 
the WIPO Secretariat has stated: 
To some extent, it could be argued that [the] criteria [of novelty, 
non-obviousness and utility] are overlapping with the inherent 
notion of “invention.” However, it is possible for an invention, so 
defined, to fail to meet the criteria, for instance for want of novelty 
or utility. The reverse engineering of a technique that the emulator 
ignored had been previously disclosed is an invention, in spite of 
not being new. The only criterion that is actually overlapping with 
the notion of ‘invention’ is non—obviousness. There are no obvious 
inventions. But there are inventions that are more inventive than 
others. In other words, in contrast with the two other criteria, non—
obviousness is a relative one. Patentability depends on the amount 
of level of inventiveness. If correctly worded, a statutory provision 
on patentability should actually read: “patents shall be available for 
any invention provided that it is new, involves a sufficient inventive 
step and is useful.”162
The Supreme Court, in Le Roy, stated that the alternativeness of 
patentable inventions was instrumental to “the avowed policy of patent 
laws.”163 The following section will describe such an avowed policy and 
discuss how the condition of alternativeness is instrumental to it. 
comply with this requirement will cause the patent application to be denied. See generally TRIPs, 
supra note 8, art. 29.1. 
 161. For this reason, it is not strictly necessary to provide for the condition of alternativeness in 
patent statutes. The word “invention” should already contain or imply that condition in its meaning. 
 162. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTURAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC 
RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE (FIFTH SESSION); COMPOSITE STUDY ON THE 
PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 18 n.48 (Apr. 28, 2003), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2003/igc/pdf/grthf_ic_5-8.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2004). 
 163. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852). 
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III. THE CONDITION OF ALTERNATIVENESS OF INVENTIONS, AN 
INSTRUMENT OF THE METERING FUNCTION OF PATENTS 
A. The Primary Function of Patents: Accurately Metering Inventions164
The function of the patent system has thus far been explained in two 
different ways. The most common and accepted view is that patents are 
rewards granted to individuals who make contributions toward economic 
and technological progress by inventing and disclosing their inventions.165 
This notion is the reward doctrine in a nutshell. A second theory, the 
prospect theory, was proposed by Edmund Kitch.166 It challenges the 
reward doctrine on the ground that when patents are granted, inventors 
may not yet be aware of the usefulness of their inventions. Patents, 
therefore, operate as titles of legal security that permit the inventors to 
prospect the market for commercial opportunities, very much like 
concessions granted to gold prospectors.167  
Three elements of patent law show that the primary function of patents 
is not a rewarding function. First, patents represent a technical evaluation 
that an invention is new, non-obvious, capable of industrial application, 
and represents a conceptual unity. Patents do not contain any judgment as 
to the economic relevance of inventions. Actually, most patented 
inventions are economically irrelevant, because most remain unexploited 
and never reach the market. Second, patents are subject to identical 
standards, regardless of the field of technology and the technical merits of 
their subject matter.168 Third, the laws of some countries expressly 
establish that patents advance social goals, rather than rewarding 
individuals.169 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has several times made 
 164. A more lengthy discussion on the metering function of patents can be found in CARVALHO, 
supra note 6, at 1–22. 
 165. See, e.g., ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, 
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT IN A NUTSHELL 14–15 (1990); J. SCHMIDT-SZALEWSKI & J.L. 
PIERRE, DROIT DE LA PROPRIETE INDUSTRIELLE [The Law of Industrial Property] 1–7 (1996). 
 166. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 
(1977). 
 167. Id. 
 168. However, an exception to the non-discrimination principle might be identified in the laws of 
several WTO Members, which extend patent terms in some fields of technology, such as 
pharmaceuticals and agricultural-chemical products. See, e.g., Council Regulation 1768/92, 1992 O.J. 
(L182) 2 (European Union regulation concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate 
for medicinal products). See also 35 U.S.C. § 155 (2000) (providing for extension of patents whose 
subject matter is subject to Food & Drug Administration review). However, such an extension does not 
relate to the merits of the technology, but the fact that those products are delayed in reaching the 
market by the necessity of obtaining administrative approval.
 169. See, e.g., Patent Law, Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 1 (as amended by Law No. 220 of 1999) 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p701 Carvalho.doc 7/21/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
736 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 3:701 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the same point.170 Consequently, courts may not allow patentees to extract 
as large a market reward as they would like. 
Kitch’s proposal that patents are not rewards and that they act to 
guarantee that inventions will not be pillaged by free riders, enabling 
patentees to seek the highest market value for their inventions, relies on 
three features of the patent system. The first is the scope of patent claims, 
“a scope that reaches well beyond what the reward function would 
require.”171 Second, some rules, such as priority and time-bar, compel the 
inventor to apply early “whether or not something of value (and hence a 
reward) has been found.”172 Third, many technologically important patents 
were issued before the possibility of commercial exploitation existed.173 
Kitch concluded, therefore, that patents are not rewards.174 Kitch added 
that it is common practice that, when a patent is issued, there is no reward 
to gain because the patentee does not yet know the practical value of the 
invention.175
The prospect theory poses the same problems as does the reward 
doctrine: both are only partially correct and neither constitutes a primary 
concern of the patent system. Inventions are always patented before being 
market-tested due to the fact that legal requirements, such as novelty and 
statutory bars, urge inventors to rush to patent offices.176  
(Japan), available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/shoukaie/patent.htm (last visted Mar. 30, 2004). “The 
purpose of this Law shall be to encourage inventions by promoting their protection and utilization so 
as to contribute to the development of industry.”  
 170. See, e.g., Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330–31 (1945) (“The 
primary purpose of our patent system is not reward of the individual but the advancement of the arts 
and sciences.”) (internal citation omitted); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942) 
(“[T]he promotion of the progress of science and the useful arts is the ‘main object’; reward of 
inventors is secondary and merely a means to that end.”) (quoting Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1 
(1829)); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) (“[T]his 
court has consistently held that the primary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of private 
fortunes for the owners of patents, but is ‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts’”) 
(internal citations omitted); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942) (“The 
grant to the inventor of the special privilege of a patent monopoly carries out a public policy adopted 
by the Constitution and laws of the United States, ‘to promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 171. Kitch, supra note 166, at 267. 
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. at 267. A practical application of the prospect theory (an optimal patent life economic 
model) can be found in Lawrence M. DeBrock, Market Structure, Innovation, and Optimal Patent 
Life, 28 J.L. & ECON. 223 (1985). 
 174. Kitch, supra note 166, at 268. 
 175. Id. Kitch cited fifty examples of inventions whose inventors were obliged to apply for a 
patent early, but whose commercial success took too long to become a reality. Id. at 272. 
 176. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2004) (the statutory bar rule). In several countries that follow the first-
to-file system, the so-called one-year “grace period” exempts inventions disclosed by the inventor 
itself (or by a third party who obtained the information from the inventor) from being included in prior 
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Nevertheless, a considerable amount of patented inventions correspond 
to the actual needs of the market. Roger Beck asserts that “40 percent to 
50 percent of patents apparently are not used,” thus we may infer that only 
50 percent to 60 percent of patented inventions are practiced.177 Regardless 
of the exact percentage of unused patented inventions, there exist many 
patents that have been developed as an answer to immediate market needs, 
yet technical and economic failure, rather than anticipation, makes these 
patents worthless.178 Moreover, individual inventors commonly author 
inventions without any concern for market demands; they may have no 
commitment other than the mere pleasure of inventing. Such individuals 
represent a small percentage of patent applicants,179 but firms generally are 
more conservative.180
Patents function primarily as metering devices for society to measure 
an invention’s value, thus allowing patentees to stipulate competitive 
prices for inventions and, consequently, for the products and services that 
embody them. Patents, therefore, are primarily neutral social mechanisms 
art, if the disclosure takes place within a certain period prior to filing of the patent application. The 
“grace period” does not supersede the duty to rush to the patent office; it is merely a mechanism to 
permit the inventor to seek his or her peers’ cooperation without fear of losing the right to apply for a 
patent. The “grace period” has been adopted in many national and regional laws, but to date it has not 
been contemplated in any multilateral treaty. Some examples of national laws with a “grace period” 
include those of Brazil, Bulgaria, Germany, France, New Zealand, Norway, Panama. Examples of 
regional laws include OAPI (the Organisation Africaine de la Propriété Intellectuelle), and the Andean 
Community of Nations (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela). The EPO (European Patent 
Organization) also follows this practice. These laws and treaties are available at http://clea.wipo.int 
(last visited May 14, 2004). 
 177. Roger L. Beck, Competition for Patent Monopolies, in 3 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 
91, 98 (Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. ed., 1981). In contrast, Ernest Gellhorn states that up to ninety percent of 
all patents are unused “because they have no commercial value.” ERNEST GELLHORN, ANTITRUST 
LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 387 (3d ed. 1986).  
 178. An example of this kind of invention can be found in United States v. E. I. Du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), aff’d, 351 U.S. 377 (1956). Du Pont owned 368 
patents relating to the manufacture of cellophane, sixty-eight of which were to be used by Du Pont’s 
customers. Id. at 140. Du Pont used only ninety-three (31%) of the 300 remaining patents. Id. at 141. 
The remaining 207 patented inventions were not practiced because of several technical problems, such 
as non-availability of critical materials, high costs and obsolescence. Id. at 140–41. One may conclude 
that those 207 patents had no prospective function even though, when Du Pont developed them, the 
expectation was that they would be exploited immediately. 
 179. Alfred E. Kahn, Deficiencies of American Patent Law, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 475, 481 (1940). 
 180.  
Despite the encouraging tendency of modern industrial laboratories to become scientific 
centers as well as improvement workshops, it cannot be doubted that “insiders” do tend to be 
more conservative and to the lose broader view. . . . When private enterprise provides the 
means and compensation for research, those who pursue it will fix their attention on what 
business looks upon as practical tasks and practical results. 
Id. at 482. 
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that allow inventors to adequately allocate private resources to promote 
new technology. 
Allowing inventors to obtain rents from the results of their activities 
promotes invention and innovation. This result can be achieved in two 
different ways. The first method is to require users of the inventions to pay 
for them directly. For this result to happen, it is necessary to establish a 
legal mechanism that allows inventors to put a price on their inventions. 
Patents and trade secrets perform precisely this role. The second method to 
obtain rents is to provide inventors with public funds or other privileges. 
In this case, governments allocate rents to inventors and, thus, users of the 
inventions will pay for them indirectly through taxes.  
Social welfare and economic growth depend, in part, on technological 
innovation, which facilitates a more efficient utilization of available scarce 
resources and also provides access to new resources. Society certainly 
requires that a continued flow of inventions be developed and made 
generally available. To many, patents are also necessary to induce this 
essential flow of inventions. However, this proposition is untrue: patents 
are not strictly necessary to promote inventive activities. History shows 
that societies around the world have lived and evolved technologically 
without a patent system (i.e., without a system of private property rights 
whereby owners have the right to exclude others from using their technical 
creations). For thousands of years, governments relied on public awards to 
promote and encourage invention. In technological fields, where awards 
did not reach inventors or were not granted, economic interests in 
inventions have been protected through trade secrets. 
Obviously, patents do not necessarily lead to an optimal exploitation of 
inventions, but by providing disclosure, patents reduce the enormous 
transaction costs involved in trade secrets.181 Transaction costs, as 
Eggertsson explains, are closely related to the cost of acquiring 
information.182 Thus,  
 181. Transaction costs include the costs of measuring and enforcing rights. See generally R. H. 
COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 178 (1990). Chapters one (The Firm, The Market, and 
The Law) and two (The Nature of the Firm) explain the role of transaction costs in the market. In the 
absence of transaction costs, the law would be irrelevant because individuals would always negotiate 
without cost in hopes of increasing the value of production. In a world of zero transaction costs, 
property rights would not be necessary. The cornerstone of Coase’s thesis and known as (the “Coase 
theorem”) was thus formulated by Stigler: “under perfect competition private and social costs will be 
equal.” Id. at 14. The axiom that arises from the Coase theorem is that a clear definition of property 
rights reduces transaction costs and thus leads to a higher aggregate value of conflicting interests’ 
output. 
 182. THRÁINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 15 (1991). 
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[w]hen information is costly, various activities related to the 
exchange of property rights between individuals give rise to 
transaction costs. These activities include: 1. The search for 
information about the distribution of price and quality of 
commodities and labour inputs . . .; 3. The making of contracts; 4. 
The monitoring of contractual partners to see whether they abide by 
the terms of the contract; 5. The enforcement of a contract and the 
collection of damages when partners fail to observe their contractual 
obligations; 6. The protection of property rights against third-party 
encroachment—for example, protection against pirates or even 
against the government in the case of illegitimate trade.183
The problem with trade secret protection is that it fails to provide accurate 
and reliable information on the quality and quantity of technology. A trade 
secret licensee cannot fully monitor the complete disclosure of the secret 
by the licensor.  
When it comes to enforcement, trade secrets lack a predetermined term 
of protection. As a result, there is no established rule on how long court 
injunctions should last. When transaction costs are positive, Coase states: 
the law plays a crucial role in determining how resources are used. 
But it does more than this. With zero transaction costs, the same 
result is reached because contractual arrangements will be made to 
modify the rights and duties of the parties so as to make it in their 
interest to undertake those actions which maximize the value of 
production. With positive transaction costs, some or all of these 
contractual arrangements become too costly to carry out. The 
incentives to take some of the actions which would have maximized 
the value of production disappear.184
Trade secrets increase transactions costs by inducing trading partners to 
engage in actions that maximize the value of production. Patents serve to 
reduce these transaction costs by lifting the veil of secrecy and increasing 
the amount of information available. They help the market quantify 
technology through specifications and claims, and also by qualifying the 
rights granted. 
Technology is quantified by describing the invention “in a manner 
sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a 
 183. Id. 
 184. COASE, supra note 181, at 178. 
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person skilled in the art.”185 This requirement may be supplemented by 
indicating “the best mode for carrying out the invention known to the 
inventor at the filing date.”186 Claims, which point out the specific aspects 
that the inventor regards as his or her invention, contribute to the precise 
identification of subject matter. To some extent, patents describe 
inventions in the same manner as deeds describe the geographical limits of 
real estate. 
A problem with quantifying technology, however, is that identifying an 
invention is far from a matter of mathematical precision. In particular, 
describing prior art and giving accurate notice of the technical background 
of the invention may be extremely difficult. For this reason, legal 
enforcement of patent rights frequently becomes a problem of interpreting 
patent specifications. Even so, patents are valuable as accurate meters and 
as an alternative to trade secrets, although their accuracy is not absolute. 
Qualification of rights is provided by two factors. First, rights created 
erga omnes are property rights, which generate a negative duty to refrain 
from trespassing.187 Second, patent terms predetermine the extent of any 
injunction that courts may issue against infringers; this stands in sharp 
contrast to the indefinite duration of secrecy available for trade secrets. 
Trade secrets are protected for as long as their holders are willing or 
able to keep them secret. However, the law does not protect knowledge 
per se with respect to trade secrets, but efforts undertaken to conceal that 
knowledge. In other words, secrecy is protected only to the extent that 
competitors may not illegitimately invade the secret holder’s privacy. 
One should not forget that patents are essentially a market mechanism 
and that the reduced cost of obtaining information is only relevant in a free 
market. Actual or potential competitors, pressed by market needs and 
expectations, are the only significant users of the patent system, insofar as 
the system permits them to better evaluate inventions. It follows then, that 
in the absence of competitive forces, as in a monopolistic market or a 
centrally-planned economy, the value of the patent system is limited to 
 185. TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 29.1. 
 186. Id. The “best mode” requirement is optional in most WTO Member sates, but mandatory in 
the United States. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2004). 
 187. Patents are property rights in intangible goods, possession of which does not prevent others 
from simultaneously possessing them. In contrast, domain over tangible goods excludes others per se. 
For example, no one can construct a house on land where another house stands. Therefore, property 
rights in tangible goods are defined as rights to use and exploit. The right to exclude others from use is 
a natural, if not physical, consequence of possession. This situation is reversed for intangible goods, 
knowledge and ideas. Rather than a right to use intangible goods, property owners must have the right 
to exclude others from using and exploiting ideas. 
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peripheral and secondary functions, serving as a source of technical 
information and of commercial prestige. 
The fact that patents and public funding are alternate mechanisms does 
not mean that the concepts that lie behind these mechanisms are 
necessarily incompatible; they are simply different. Governments still rely 
upon those earlier tools to promote specific technical innovations. The 
patent system assumes that the inventor will seek to recoup the costs of 
research and development (“R&D”) from the market.188 Governments may 
also subsidize inventive activities in areas where the private sector is 
unwilling or incapable of undertaking the necessary research. In the health 
sector, for example, mechanisms for private appropriation of inventions 
frequently co-exist with government subsidies.189
Accordingly, patents are alternatives to public funding only insofar as 
they do not pose the problems of efficiency that politically-biased 
decisions tend to generate. Patents reduce transaction costs that arise from 
managing technology through trade secrets and government funding to the 
extent that they improve the evaluation and pricing of protected 
technology. They do so both by improving the quantification of the subject 
matter and by improving the qualification of rights granted. Rewards and 
public funding certainly continue to play a role where governments want 
inventors to undertake research in specific fields of technology. These 
government funds should be used to cover the costs of R&D, but, 
governments must determine in advance that the inventions they want 
developed are socially worthy in order to make those funds available. It is 
exactly the issue of government predetermination that evokes the problem 
of social costs because political choices naturally take precedence over 
concerns with economic efficiency. 
 188. This explains the bizarre format given to the patent system in the former Soviet Union, 
where, besides patents, a mechanism of “inventors’ certificates” was established, through which 
patents split into two different sorts of rights. The right to a public reward was granted to the inventor, 
and property rights were granted to the State. Regulation on Discoveries, Inventions and 
Rationalization Proposals, SP SSSR 584 § 23 (1973). Because a patent system cannot effectively 
operate in a centrally-planned economy, it is not surprising that Soviet inventors almost invariably 
opted to apply for an “inventors’ certificate.” See Y.E. Maksarev, L’essor de l’activité inventive en 
Union Soviétique [The Development of Inventive Activity in the Soviet Union], LA PROPRIÉTÉ 
INDUSTRIELLE [INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY] 154, 156 (1978). In the first three years of the Regulation, 
Soviet inventors did not apply for patents, but only for certificates. Id. Soviet patents became mere 
springboards for the Soviet Government to obtain private property rights in market-oriented 
economies. Id. at 159. After three years of Regulation operation, the Soviet Government had filed 
more than thirty-five thousand patent applications in foreign countries. Id. 
 189. The U.S. Patent Act includes an entire chapter dealing with patent rights for inventions made 
with federal assistance and funding. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2000). 
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To operate efficiently, patents need a free-market environment. In the 
absence of the interplay of market forces, patents are merely pieces of 
paper with some technical content.190 For that reason, the TRIPs 
Agreement assumes in its preamble that intellectual property rights, 
including patents, “are private rights.”191 The TRIPs agreement extends 
transitional preferential treatment to any “[m]ember which is in the 
process of transformation from a centrally-planned into a market, free-
enterprise economy.”192 Likewise, in very poor countries, patents play an 
extremely limited role. In those countries, market forces are nearly 
irrelevant; consequently, the competitive framework, without which 
patents cannot operate as metering devices, is absent.  
Of course, patents may also have an important role to play as a 
mechanism to transfer publicly funded inventions to private companies. 
Patents not only permit public institutions to collect private revenues, 
which may be needed to fund new research, but also reduce the costs and 
increase the efficiency of licensing of technology patents. 
In conclusion, the patent system exists as the only known legal 
institution that allows inventors to put a price on technology while, at the 
same time, allowing society to measure the adequacy of such a price with 
relative efficiency through the competitive interplay of market forces. The 
cornerstone justification of the patent system is that it reduces transaction 
costs, compared with government subsidies and trade secrets. 
B. The Metering Function of Patents and the Condition of Alternativeness 
of Inventions 
Accurately metering inventions requires a competitive approach: 
society must compete for the claimed invention. The interaction of 
competitive forces allows society to evaluate patents; however, this 
interaction only takes place when the patent owner is under pressure from 
other existing or potential technologies. When an inventor obtains a patent 
and the claimed invention is commercially useful, competitors may adopt 
one or more of the following options: they may obtain a license from the 
patent owner; they may continue using available technology; they may 
obtain a license to use a competing technology owned by another 
 190. Under the former Soviet regime, patents clearly did not give additional rights to inventors. 
See supra note 188. 
 191. TRIPs, supra note 8, at pmbl. 
 192. TRIPs, supra note 8, arts. 65.2, 65.3. Those WTO Members were entitled to the same five-
year transitional period as developing country Members. Id. 
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competitor; or they may make their own invention, either by alter-
inventing or by inventing around the invention in question.193  
Alter-invention provides a means of competition with patented 
inventions, as well as an accurate metering of competition. Without alter-
invention, the patent system loses its efficiency and its purpose. One 
notable exception is gene patents, which are not susceptible to alter-
invention, and therefore run counter to the very rationale of the patent 
system.194
One could argue that gene patents are important for encouraging 
scientists to identify genes and their role in the human body as a tool for 
the development of the biotechnology industry. This assertion is mistaken 
because, notwithstanding all the incentives that the biotechnology industry 
 193. Obtaining a license from the patent owner is generally not a competitors’ first choice. It is not 
evident that the patent owner will agree to transfer his knowledge and accept increased competition 
without imposing conditions that limits the licensees’ ability to reduce his or her market share. 
Contractual licensing may indeed be the last resort. Licensing agreements imply the payment of fees, 
which necessarily gives the patent owner a competitive advantage over licensees, assuming other 
manufacturing and distribution cost factors are equal. 
 194. One commentator has followed exactly the opposite reasoning to reach the same conclusion 
(that pure product patents for DNA sequences should not be patentable subject matter). See Denis 
Schertenleib, The Patentability and Protection of DNA-based Inventions in the EPO and the European 
Union, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 125 (2003). This commentator bases his view on the notion that 
“patents are fundamentally anti-competitive and great care is needed for an acceptable balance to be 
found between the promotion of competition and the protection of intellectual property rights.” Id. 
Because “widespread patenting of sequences will lead to uncertainties in the scope of claims and to 
litigation, with the inevitable unfairness of the first patentees gaining a stranglehold on this area of 
technology,” and having in mind that “[p]atent law evolved to ensure progress and competition. If, 
within the current legislative framework, it cannot promote these functions, then there should be no 
impediments to change” (change referring to the change in practice of the European Directive on 
Biotechnological Inventions).” Id. at 138. The commentator states that, because the same sequence can 
appear in different genes, granting a patent on a certain sequence gives the patentee control over other 
(non-claimed) genes. Id. at 137. As a matter of course, if one agrees that patents are inherently anti-
competitive, the obvious and necessary conclusion is that if more inventions are refused patents, the 
system will be more competitive. The problem with this reasoning is one of economics: patents do 
promote competition for the reasons explained in this Article. See supra Part III.A. The 
microeconomic environment of rivalry and business opportunities is not harmed by granting patents. 
This environment of rivalry and business opportunities is a crucial component of productivity, which is 
the single most important element for assessing microeconomic competitiveness. See Michael Porter, 
Building the Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity: Findings from the Business Competitiveness 
Index, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2003–2004 at 38, available at http://www.weforum.org/ 
pdf/gcr/GCR_2003_2004/BCI_Chapter.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2004). Otherwise, countries that 
grant fewer patents, such as Honduras, would be more competitive than those that grant more patents, 
such as the United States. See http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/publications/a/pdf/patents.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2004) (includes statistical data on patents granted per country); Microeconomic 
Competitiveness Index 2002–2003, http://www.weforum.org/pdf/grc/GCR_2002_2003/GRC_ 
Rankings_2002_2003.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2003). The problem of gene patents is not in the scope 
of the claims or in the risk of litigation arising from patents on partial sequences; rather it is in the 
nature of the sequence itself, which does not meet the conditions of patentability, regardless of the 
scope of the respective claims. 
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needs, the patent system is not the appropriate mechanism to promote 
upstream scientific research. The patent system was devised for evaluating 
inventions, not for promoting scientific discoveries. The government can 
promote these discoveries through tax and credit incentives. If society 
values the work of identifying genes and the proteins they code for, it may 
allow the government to divert tax money to benefit biotechnology 
research. Promoting scientific research is not, as the U.S. Supreme Court 
stated in Le Roy, “the avowed policy of patent laws.”195
One exception stands, however, to the condition of alternativeness of 
inventions: in some exceptional cases, a patented invention may become a 
technical standard imposed by the government for the sake of public 
policy, in areassuch as health or environmental protection. For example, 
under the Clean Air Act,196 when patentees’ competitors are legally 
required to adopt the technical solution invented by the patent owner, they 
may be entitled to obtain a compulsory license from a district court.197
The Clean Air Act does not provide for a blanket, compulsory licensing 
scheme but instead requires a case-by-case test under which possibly 
existing alternatives must be scrutinized. It is true that the options for 
alternative inventions are greatly reduced in the case of standardized 
technology. However, this option is not totally absent, because a 
competitor can alter-invent or reinvent the standard technology. In this 
case, the competitor convinces the appropriate government agency that the 
alternative invention is at least as safe, or even safer, than the adopted 
technical standard. In that case, the agency may decide to adopt a different 
standard technique or device that would compete with or modify the 
original standard.  
Second, standardizing techniques that reduce the alternativeness of 
inventions are the exception rather than the norm. Because they hinder the 
efficiency of a free competitive environment, techniques are standardized 
only in exceptional cases where human health and safety are at risk. 
Normally, the market should be open to different techniques so that 
 195. LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852). 
 196. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2000).  
 197. 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2000). Compulsory licenses are ordered when: (i) the patented technology 
is “not otherwise reasonably available” (for example, the patent owner fails to agree on a voluntary 
license when offered in reasonable commercial conditions); (ii) the patented technology “is necessary 
to enable any person required to comply with the technical standard in question;” and (iii) “there are 
no reasonable alternative methods to accomplish such purpose.” Id. The mandatory licensing shall be 
granted when “the unavailability of such right may result in a substantial lessening of competition or 
tendency to create a monopoly in any line of commerce in any section of the country. The technical 
standards to which § 7608 refers concern standards of performance of air pollutant emission, and 
relates to both stationary and moving sources. 
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consumers may select the products, methods and devices of their own 
choice. To achieve this free choice, patented inventions must be subject to 
alternativeness. 
Finally, in the case of mandatory technical standards, alternativeness is 
reduced ex post facto, that is only after the competent government 
authorities have assessed the technical relevance of a given invention and 
decided to transform it into a standard. In contrast, products of nature 
cannot be alter-invented ex ante facto. 
C. The Impossibility of Applying the Essential Facility Doctrine in the 
Field of Patents as a Consequence of the Condition of Alternativeness 
of Inventions 
Compulsory licenses of mandatory technical standards may be 
scrutinized under the essential facility doctrine, which states that “the 
owner of a properly defined ‘essential facility’ has the duty to share it with 
others, and that a refusal to do so violates § 2 of the Sherman Act.”198 
Essential facilities have been classified according to three types of 
categories: (1) natural monopolies or joint venture arrangements subject to 
significant economies of scale; (2) structures, plants, or other valuable 
productive assets that were created as part of a regulatory regime, whether 
or not they are properly natural monopolies; or (3) structures that are 
owned by the government and whose creation or maintenance is 
subsidized.”199
The essential facility doctrine was comprehensively articulated by the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in MCI Communications.200 The court 
identified four elements of the doctrine:  
(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a 
competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the 
essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a 
competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility.201  
 198. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE, 273 (1994). Section 2 of the Sherman Act states: “Every person who shall monopolize, or 
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any 
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty 
of a felony. . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2003). 
 199. HOVENKAMP, supra note 198, at 274. 
 200. MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 201. Id. at 1132–33. 
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Thus, in an “essential facility” situation, the owner is a monopolist who 
wishes to keep his monopoly or to deny it to a downstream use. However, 
a facility is only essential when it cannot be practically or reasonably 
duplicated. This situation occurs in the case of inventions concerning 
mandatory technical standards. Government regulations require equipment 
manufacturers to use this technology, therefore competitors cannot adopt 
different technical solutions. In cases where those standards are covered 
by exclusive patent rights, competitors do not have access to those 
standards without the patent owner’s authorization. This gives rise to an 
essential facility situation.202
Absent regulatory standardization, the essential facility doctrine does 
not apply to patents because patentable inventions are essentially 
susceptible to being alter-invented. Thus, the doctrine’s second element, as 
defined in MCI, cannot be logically met.203 This was the reasoning of the 
District Court in Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support 
Corp.,204 the case providing the most extensive discussion of the essential 
facility doctrine in the context of intellectual property law.205
The facts of the case were as follows: Data General (DG) sold 
computer systems and provided services for their maintenance and repair. 
Grumman provided services to maintain and repair several computer 
systems, including those manufactured by DG.206 DG brought an action 
for damages and injunctive relief against Grumman’s use of a diagnostic 
program (MV/ADEX) developed by DG.207 The program is used both to 
design DG’s computer systems and to repair systems in use.208 Grumman 
counterclaimed against DG, alleging, among other claims, a violation of 
section two of the Sherman Antitrust Act.209
Grumman’s reliance on the essential facility doctrine was grounded on 
the fact that DG licensed the diagnostic tool only to those purchasers of 
DG computer systems in its Cooperative Maintenance Organization (CMO 
program).210 Third Party Maintainers (TPM), such as Grumman, were 
 202. Government regulations that establish this essential facility typically provide access to this as 
well. See, e.g., supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 203. See MCI Communications Corp., 708 F.2d 1081. 
 204. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 761 F. Supp. 185 (D. Mass. 1991), aff’d, 
36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 205. See Gregory V.S. McCurdy, Intellectual Property and Competition: Does the Essential 
Facilities Doctrine Shed Any New Light, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 472, 475–76 (2003). 
 206. Data General, 761 F. Supp. at 187. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 189. 
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denied access to the CMO program, except as required to maintain their 
own DG computers.211 In other words, DG refused to authorize Grumman 
to use its diagnostic program to provide maintenance services to third 
parties. Grumman invoked two U.S. Supreme Court opinions dealing with 
the essential facility doctrine, Aspen Skiing Co.212 and Otter Tail Power 
Co.213
The District Court concluded that the issue at bar differed from the two 
Supreme Court cases. In its analysis of Aspen, the District Court noted 
that: 
Grumman and other TPMs have the opportunity to develop 
competing diagnostics and tools for maintenance. Two diagnostics 
have, in fact, been developed by TPMs. . . . Grumman protests that 
it is unable to produce a diagnostic because it cannot get the 
necessary schematics and DG could easily drive any competing 
diagnostic into obsolescence by simple modifications in design. . . . 
Grumman, however, makes no allegations that DG has in fact 
attempted to subvert competitors’ efforts to develop and implement 
competing diagnostics. TPMs have demonstrated the ability to 
develop diagnostics, even if they are not as efficient as 
MV/ADEX.214
The District Court also examined Grumman’s allegation that 
MV/ADEX was an essential facility “which DG must share with its 
competitors.”215 “The [c]rux of Grumman’s essential facility argument,” 
the District Court noted, “is that only the manufacturer of computer 
systems is capable of developing a diagnostic tool which is an essential 
device in the repair of those computers.”216 After confirming the four-part 
test for the essential facility doctrine established in MCI, the District Court 
invoked the condition of alternativeness to affirm that intellectual property 
assets can by definition be duplicated and, thus, cannot be considered 
“essential facilities.”217 The District judge said: 
DG does not have monopoly power in the sale of computer systems 
and thus is not using a bottleneck to create another monopoly. The 
 211. Id. 
 212. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
 213. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
 214. Data General, 761 F. Supp. at 191. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 192. 
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“bottleneck” of its superior knowledge in the design of DG 
computers is insufficient to invoke the essential facilities doctrine; a 
better mousetrap is not necessarily an essential facility. The 
Sherman Act has not been interpreted to require manufacturers to 
abandon their advantage in creating accessories to their systems. If 
manufacturers of complex and innovative systems were required to 
share with competitors the development of accessories, because 
they had a possibly absolute advantage through producing the 
system, the incentives of copyright and patent laws would be 
severely undermined. Not only would the manufacturer, who is in 
the best position to create these accessories, have less incentive to 
do so, but also the impetus for competitors to reverse engineer and 
produce competing solutions would be reduced.218
The District Court assumed that one of the patent system’s goals is to 
lead competitors to produce competing solutions. That assumption, 
however, is only possible when one understands that competing solutions 
are always obtainable. A better mousetrap is not necessarily an essential 
facility because there is always a worse mousetrap to compete with it. 
Consumers may prefer to acquire the latter if the price or other commercial 
conditions are more appealing than the technical advance of the former. 
Therefore, it is impossible, as a matter of law, to apply the essential 
facilities doctrine to patent law, because a certain technical solution may 
never be deemed incapable of being duplicated invented around or re-
invented. 
D. Problems of a Poorly Functioning Patent System 
There is a practical need to make known the inconvenience of gene 
patents. Gene patents run counter to the procompetitive rationale of the 
patent system; as a result, they do not conform with the basic function of 
patents. Poorly functioning patents are not merely a question of legal 
logic, but are indeed a source of serious economic problems. 
The biotechnology industry in the medical field is still at its early 
stages, so it is perhaps too soon to determine how gene patents negatively 
impact society by means more precise than anecdotal evidence.219 
However, some events in the history of the patent system clearly illustrate 
 218. Id. at 192 (emphasis added). 
 219. See supra note 10–12 and accompanying text (referencing patents on breast cancer genes and 
the gene for Canavan disease).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/2
p701 Carvalho.doc 7/21/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] THE PROBLEM OF GENE PATENTS 749 
 
 
 
 
 
 
how a poorly functioning patent system can undermine competition and 
thus contribute to unbalanced distribution of income and market power 
concentration.  
Historian Earl Hayter eloquently identifies how the malfunctioning of 
the patent system in the last decades of the nineteenth century caused 
agrarian discontent and ultimately contributed to the populist revolt of the 
1890s.220 Farmers, at the time, felt suffocated by a patent system that 
deprived them of the fruit of their work.221 Patent owners proliferated 
numerous frivolous lawsuits against “innocent” farmers who resisted 
payment.222 This state of affairs led the farmers to organize and voice their 
anger and criticism against the Patent Office,223 Congress,224 and the 
judiciary.225 Several bills were unsuccessfully introduced in Congress to 
modify the patent system.226 As a result, farmers found themselves 
 220. Earl W, Hayter, The Patent System and Agrarian Discontent, 1875–1888, 34 MISS. VALLEY 
HIST. REV. 59 (1947). Hayter details how thousands of small American farmers were charged royalties 
for patents on agricultural devices, most of which had been inappropriately granted. Farmers were 
often irritated because patents on various essential articles were controlled  
most generally by a group of manufacturers called a patent “ring”. . . . [Old claims that] had 
become inoperative and unremunerative to the inventor were often bought up at a small fee 
by a patent “ring” and through “manipulation of the Patent Office, or by inadvertance of the 
officials,” were reissued not on the original claim, but on a broadened or revised patent to 
cover subsequent improvements. Extension of a patent for a seven-year period was also 
possible under the law through congressional action if the owner could show that he had not 
secured adequate compensation for the benefits derived. . . . This practice not only kept a 
patent in effect for a longer period of time, but it also made it possible for a “ring” to use 
original and enlarged claims to develop a monopoly of the article. 
Id. at 62 (internal citation omitted). Moreover, many patents were issued to different persons on the 
same article. Id. at 63. Trifling improvements were eligible for patent protection and thus every article 
would be covered by patents. A Michigan farmer had the following comment: The patent system is  
in our boots, it is in our clothes, it is in the tool we work with, in the buggy we ride in, in the 
harness on the horse, in the whip we strike him with. It is to be found in our fences, in our 
gates, in our pumps, in our kitchen, in our food, and finally in our coffin. 
Id. at 63–64 (internal citation omitted). 
 221. In several cases, “persons were sued for articles that they had developed themselves or which 
they had borrowed from neighbors before any patents had been granted.” Id. at 66 (internal citations 
omitted). 
 222. By 1878, “as many as five hundred cases [had been] filed in the St. Paul district court alone.” 
Id. at 67 (internal citations omitted). In Des Moines, “two hundred drive-well cases were filed in one 
single day.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Hayter notes that “the drivewell patent was one of the most 
bitterly contested patents in the history of the United States.” Id. at 76. The Supreme Court, “in a 
fourth hearing, more than two years after the patent expired, . . . reversed its earlier judgment and ruled 
‘that that patent was void and ought never to have been issued.’” Id. at 76–77 (internal citation 
omitted).  
 223. Id. at 64. 
 224. Id. at 79. 
 225. Id. at 79–80. 
 226. Id. at 81. In addition to the lack of political support in the conservative Senate, farmers were 
opposed by inventors, including Thomas Edison. Id.  
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“embroiled in constant conflict with the patent owners, and the nature of 
patent laws resulted in continual harassment by royalty collectors and 
patent agents.”227  
Hayter describes a serious situation, one of general unrest, that arose 
from mishandling of the patent system a misapplication of its purpose of 
promoting invention. While it is true that invention must be promoted, the 
facts narrated by Hayter clearly show that the patent system was used to 
encourage greed rather than to promote further invention.228 Under a 
capitalist regime, an inventor is entitled to reap as many benefits as he or 
she can from his or her invention. The patent that allows the inventor to do 
so is a good patent when the idea covered is an invention (as opposed to a 
product of nature) and meets the conditions of novelty, non-obviousness 
and utility. However, in this case, patents granted for trifling 
improvements or to the wrong inventors were the origin of the problem. 
Furthermore, the poor performance of the patent system was aggravated 
by competitors’ collusion and misuse of patents.  
Hayter’s article is a powerful illustration of the proposition that a 
poorly performing patent system can indeed cause serious economic and 
social problems. A more recent example of social discontent with the 
patent system occurred with regard to patents on therapeutic and surgical 
methods.229 In the latter case, Congress moved swiftly to eliminate the 
 227. Id. at 82. Hayter concludes: 
It would appear that if there were any assessable contributions resulting from these struggles, 
they added to the irritations of the already discontented Grangers. For it was these additional 
economic grievances of the late [nineteen-] seventies and eighties, heaped upon those that had 
accumulated from the early and middle seventies, which finally culminated in, and laid the 
basis for, the Populist revolt of the nineties. 
Id. at 82. Even if agrarian discontent did not lead to a thorough review of the patent system, most of 
the problems that caused it were solved by the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 
Stat. 209 (1890) (current version 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2000)). Patent owners organzing under “rings” and 
lodging frivolous lawsuits could thereafter be scrutinized as antitrust violators and hence, were subject 
to criminal penalties. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Doctors and surgeons are immune from patent infringement lawsuits arising from therapeutic 
and surgical methods. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1996). This legislaton was introduced after an infuriated 
public debate caused by a lawsuit lodged by Dr. Pallin, an ophthalmologist surgeon, who had obtained 
a patent for the shape and the location of the incision for cataract surgery. U.S. Pat. No. 5,080,111 
(issued Jan. 14, 1992). Dr. Pallin attempted to enforce his patent against a colleague and his 
colleague’s clinic. The District Court of Vermont, in a consent order dated March 28, 1996, dismissed 
the action on grounds of invalidity of the claims. This case outraged the medical community as it 
revealed Dr. Pallin’s intention to recover damages from all surgeons who had used his technique. 
Because this technique was commonly used, virtually every ophthalmologist in the United States was 
threatened with a costly lawsuit. See http://www.ascrs.org/advocacy/patpr2.html (last visited May 14, 
2004); supra notes 35 and 59 and accompanying text. 
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problem even if it did so with possible disregard for TRIPs provisions.230 
At the same time, patents on therapeutic and surgical methods are not 
economically relevant because doctors have other mechanisms for 
appropriating inventions in that field.231 Therefore, no one should fear a 
reduction or slowing in technical development of medical methods and 
techniques for want of patent incentives. 
Genes are the building blocks of life. Therefore, any method or product 
for treating genetic disease depends on identifying and describing the 
genes involved. Property rights in genes structures are disruptive to the 
establishment of a sound, viable, and competitive industry, and do not 
promote competition or spur development of new biotechnological 
products and processes.  
Certainly the biotechnology industry should be able to reap substantial 
profits from its research and product development. This author firmly 
believes that the patent system, when adequately framed, is the best tool 
society possesses for the accurate evaluation of inventions. The patent 
system is not the appropriate mechanism for obtaining gains from 
identifying, isolating, and purifying genes. Other social tools, such as tax 
credits and other government financial incentives, have demonstrated their 
worth for this purpose. A parallel can be made with statistical data, which, 
in spite of its importance, is not protected by intellectual property.232 
Genes and their functions are scientific facts, not inventions. The patent 
system was not devised to permit gains from revealing and understanding 
 230. In a letter dated September 27, 1996, addressed to Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, Ambassador Jennifer Hillman, then General Counsel of the USTR, noted that 
the proposed exception to patent rights raised questions about whether it was covered by Article 30 of 
the TRIPs Agreement. See CARVALHO, supra note 6, at 176. 
 231. Therapeutic methods are generally considered non-patentable subject matter. The justification 
for this treatment has traditionally been based on professional ethics—therapeutic methods have 
traditionally been scrutinized by peer review, not by patent offices, and the inventors’ colleagues have 
been considered entitled to share the inventions. However, the true reason for the lack of patent 
protection in the field of therapeutic methods lies elsewhere. Therapeutic methods, as well as 
diagnostic and surgical methods, are, with few exceptions, individual procedures whose success 
depends much more on the individual skills of doctors or surgeons than on the methods themselves. In 
other words, therapeutic methods are not to be mass applied, even where they are repeatedly applied. 
This confines their economic relevance to the extremely narrow market of the few patients of a given 
doctor or surgeon. Therefore, it is not necessary to patent those methods in order to appropriate them. 
Indeed, creative doctors and surgeons will be compensated through increased professional prestige and 
higher fees. See CARVALHO, supra note 6, at 175. 
 232. Statistics are the basis for any sort of economic, financial, or political decisions made by 
individuals, firms and governments. Nonetheless, census data does not trigger copyright regulation. 
Feist Publ’n Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991). “The same is true of all facts—
scientific, historical, biographical, and news of the day.” Id. at 348. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p701 Carvalho.doc 7/21/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
752 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 3:701 
 
 
 
 
 
 
those facts. To do otherwise is to distort the patent system and diminish its 
value as a social and economic tool.  
Due to patents’ operation as “meters” that society uses to evaluate 
technology, and because gene patents cannot perform that function, when 
a patent office grants a patent on a DNA sequence it is in fact delivering a 
“broken meter.” The problem of gene patents is not that they are patents; 
the problem is that they are bad patents. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article argues that gene patents are not, nor should they be, 
patentable subject matter. Alternativeness is the first of four substantive 
conditions of patentability233 and genes, as an invention of nature, rather 
than of man, fail to meet the condition of alternativeness, as identified by 
the U.S. Supreme Court.234
The condition of alternativeness is essential for the patent system to 
work as a social mechanism to accurately meter inventions. Creations, like 
genes, that cannot be alter-invented are not prone to evaluation through 
competing market forces. Those creations cannot be accurately metered, 
which therefore reduces the merit of patents as a tool to reduce transaction 
costs. Gene patents ultimately undermine the social value of the patent 
system. 
The attention of law-makers and policy-makers must be drawn toward 
the risks of granting patents for human genes, both in their natural 
environment and after being identified, isolated, purified, and synthesized. 
The historical example of the agrarian discontent in the late nineteenth 
century and the social unrest that arose therefrom should serve as an alert 
for the risks of tolerating a malfunctioning patent system.235 In the 
European Union, such a mistake is a fait accompli: the European Directive 
allows DNA sequences to be patented when the respective genes are 
isolated and purified and their respective function is clearly stated.236 The 
present warning should, therefore, serve as a recommendation for future 
legislative action by the European Parliament and the European Council. 
In the United States, the Supreme Court may, at any time, resolve the 
 233. The other three conditions are novelty, non-obviousness and utility. 
 234. LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852). See supra section 2. This means that inventions are 
patentable when other persons are able to use or develop other methods, products or devices to employ 
the same natural principles for the same purposes. 
 235. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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issue. It should move to stop current USPTO practices granting patents on 
DNA sequences, which are based on a misunderstanding of the law. 
This Article is not opposed to the patent system. On the contrary, the 
article’s view against gene patents constitutes a defense of a properly 
functioning patent system. Society will be better off if the patent system 
works properly—a malfunctioning patent system diminishes competition, 
creates an imbalance in the distribution of wealth, and slows the pace of 
invention. 
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